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SUMMARY:

vo.' cause,

D .,ov.. ~t

Whether a warrantless search, based upon probable

1/

,,

of a closed but unsealed paper bag, found in the trunk of

~"
(., \"'\
~ ~~~~ resp's automobile during a lawful search of the automobile, was
~~ v-·t.lt \,c)-\
\~ ~J..~

'

~~"~ r.
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permissible under the Fourth Amendment.

'vi'
~V

FACTS:

A D.C. police detective was told by a reliable

informant that he had observed a man selling nar:otics from the

DEN~)~~~~~~~~
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trunk of an automobile.

Upon arriving in the area, the detective

and two other police officers observed a vehicle being driven by
resp matching the informant's description.

The officers

determined that it was registered to resp.

They then stopped the

vehicle, identified themselves, and asked resp to step out.

A

police officer spotted a round of ammunition on the front seat of
the car and, upon searching the interior of the vehicle for
weapons, found a pistol in the glove compartment.
After resp was arrested, another officer unlocked and
searched the vehicle's trunk.

In it he discovered a brown paper

lunch bag with a folded but unsealed top,
pouch.

~d

a zippered leather

He opened the paper bag and discovered in it a number of

~

glassine envelopes, each containing a white powder.

Leaving the

paper bag and the leather pouch in the trunk, the officers drove
resp's automobile to the police station.

At the station the

officers reopened the paper bag and upon analysis it was found to
contain a quantity of heroin.

One of the officers then opened

the leather pouch and found that it contained $3,200 in currency.
No search warrant had been obtained at any point in this sequence
of events.
The resp was indicted by a federal grand jury on charges
including possession with intent to distribute a controlled
substance.

A motion to suppress evidence was made and denied

after a hearing by the district judge.

Resp was convicted of the

possession with intent to distribute charge.

On appeal, a panel

of the CA DC reversed the conviction, holding that the search of
the leather pouch without a warrant violated resp's Fourth
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Amendment rights.

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).

A

majority of the panel upheld legality of the warrantless search
involving the paper bag because paper bags offer only minimal
protection against intrusion and, given their conventional uses,
are not inevitably associated with an expectation of privacy.
DECISION BELOW:

Acting upon resp's suggestion, theCA

granted rehearing en bane.

In an opinion joined by seven of its

members, the majority of the court rejected the panel's
conclusion that the warrantless search of the unsealed paper bag
was permissible.l

-

In an opinion by Judge Ginsburg, the majority

of the en bane court agreed that although resp's car was properly
stopped and searched and that the paper bag and leather pouch
properly seized, no "special exigencies" justified opening the
, ~''
..
..
'
pouch or the bag without a warrant and that no other

---

-

"established, well-drawn exception" to the warrant requirement
was applicable.

The court declined to adopt what was termed "an

unworthy container rule," in part because of the administrative
infeasibility of such a rule and in part because "it would snare
those without the means or the sophistication to use worthy
containers."

The en bane court thus perceived no distinction

between the pouch and the bag in a manner that "makes theoretical

1 On rehearing en bane the Government did not challenge
the panel's ruling regarding the warrantless search of the
leather pouch on its merfts. The Government did argue that
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 u.s. 753 (1979), should not have been
applied retroactively to the search in i~sue, and that, for that
reason, none of the evidence should have been suppressed. The CA
rejected that argument, and the Government has not sought review
of that decision in this petition.

•

:.

-4or practical sense."

They concluded that the contents of the

paper bag, as well as those of the leather pouch, should have
been suppressed.
Four members of the court dissented.

Judge Tamm, who had

written the panel opinion, adhered to his original reasoning and
conclusions in an opinion joined by Judges McKinnon and Robb,
each of whom wrote separately as well.

Judge McKinnon would have

upheld the warrantless search of the leather pouch as well as the
paper bag and would accordingly have affirmed a conviction.
Judge Robb thought that this Court's decisions required
suppression of the leather pouch but that "this result does not
make sense."

Judge Wilkey issued a separate 67-page dissent on

the ground that Arkansas v. Sanders, 442

u.s.

753 (1979), was not

properly applied retroactively to the search at issue.

He,

however, would have joined the majority as to the issues on the
merits, reluctantly concluding that Arkansas v. Sanders controls
this case and criticizing both the decision in Sanders and the
exclusionary rule.

Judge McKinnon joined Judge Wilkey's dissent

with respect to the retroactivity issue.
CONTENTIONS:
Court's

The SG, in a petition filed before this

decision in Robbins v. California, 49 U.S.L.W. 4906

(July 1, 1981), contends that the case presents an important and
recurring question similar to that in Robbins.

The decision of

the en bane CA DC that there is no distinction between
conventional types of luggage and an unsealed paper bqg is
contrary to the decisions of eight other CA's, which have
declined to extend a warrant requirement to paper bags and
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:

similar insubstantial containers.2

While acknowledging that this

Court has twice held that a warrant is required before law
I(

\

enforcement officials may search luggage
found in a vehicle,
:>
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762-766 (suitcase): United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)

(double locked footlocker),

the Court has cautioned that "not all containers and packages
found by police during the course of a search will deserve the
full protection of the Fourth Amendment."

442

u.s.

at 764, 765

n. 13.
Factors traditionally employed to determine the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection suggests that the very nature of
unsealed paper bags and similar containers is inconsistent with
the reasonable expectation that their contents will be protected
from public exposure.

Paper bags and similar packages offer at

best only minimal protection against accidental or deliberate
intrusion.

.

Js~ ~

Moreover, while a common bag may at times be pressed

into services or a repository for personal effects, such
unrepresentative use is not part of the conventional

2 See United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697 (1st Cir.
1980) (plastic and paper bags): United States v. Mannino, 635
F.2d 110 (CA 2 1980) (plastic bag): United States v. Markland,
635 F.2d 174 (CA 2 1980) (beverage bag): United States v. Bush,
No. 80-1116 (CA 3 Mar. 24, 1981) (unsealed cardboard box): United
States v. Sutton, 636 F.2d 96 (CA 5 1981) (pharmacy bag): United
States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (CA 6 1980) (closed paper bag):
United States v. Jimenez, 626 F.2d 39 (CA 7 1980) (paper bag):
United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684 (CA 9 1980) (paper bag):
United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122 (CA 10 1979) (plastic bags
of marijuana): but see United States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955
(CA 5 1981) (paper bag): United States v. Dien, 609 F~2d 1038 (CA
2 1979) (sealed box, warrant required) , adhered to on rehearing,
615 F. 2d 10 ( 1980) .

.' .
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"understandings that are recognized and permitted by society,"
which are the touchstone for assessing the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439

u.s.

128, 144 n. 12

(1978).
Resp Ross, writing after this Court decided Robbins and New
York v. Belton, 49 U.S.L.W. 4915 (July 1, 1981), argues that
given these recent cases, along with Chadwick and Sanders, the
circuit courts now have sufficient guidance from this Court in
determining whether warrants are necessary to search various
containers located in the trunk areas of vehicles.

Robbins,

which held that a closed opaque container found in a vehicle
cannot be searched without a warrant, unless its contents are in
plain view or could be inferred from their outward appearance,
should controlthis case.

Resp notes the plurality opinion's

'
reference to United States
v. Ross in commenting "what one person

may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag."

It

should not matter whether the paper bag was merely closed as
opposed to being taped shut.

Resp also thinks it significant

that the paper bag was stored in the locked trunk of the vehicle,
since containers placed in the luggage compartment should be
entitled to a greater expectation of privacy after New York v.
Belton held that police may examine the contents of any
containers found in the passenger compartment of a car upon a
lawful custodial arrest.

In short, resp contends that the

instant case was properly decided.
DISCUSSION:

~

I believe that the case is controlled by the

plurality opinion in Robbins.

Both there and here the container
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at issue was closed and opaque.

The rationale of Robbins -- that

it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish objective
criteria by which to distinguish between subtantial and
insubstantial containers -- applies here with equal force.
Footnote 13 of the Sanders' opinion, upon which the SG relies,
was interpreted in Robbins to exclude only containers whose
contents can be inferred from their outward appearance or which
are open to plain view.

I do not see how Robbins allows for a

distinction between an unsealed paper bag and a taped parcel.

1

The only justification for review, therefore, would be to
consider whether the automobile exception, Chambers v. Maroney,
399

u.s.

42 (1970), should be expanded to allow for the

warrantless search of all containers found within an automobile.
The difficulty inherent in distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible warrantless searches and the burden on law
enforcement officials to hold and transport automobiles while
seeking warrants
which affords "an opportunity for more thorough consideration of
the basic principles" leading to "some better, if more radical,
solution to the confusion that infects this benighted area of the
law."

Robbins v. California, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4910 (Opinion of

POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment).
Unless the Court wishes to engage in such basic
reconsideration, I believe that cert should be denied.
There is a response.
8/5/81
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CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

September 29, 1981

IY MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

80-2209- United States v. Ross

J

p· Z-1

In order to implement Byron's suggestion, I
propose the following form of order:
"Certiorari granted. The parties are directed
to address the question whether the Court should
reconsider Robbins v. California,
U.S.
"
Respectfully,

~u.ptmtt ~iturl itf flrt ~b ~faie.s'
:.~;tgipngLm, ~. ~· 20b!Jl,~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WH. J . BRENNAN, JR.

i

September 30, 1981

I

I

RE:

No. 80-2209 United States v. Ross

Dear John:·
-- I

I

Your Order of September 29 in the above is agreeable
with me.
Sincerely,

I

·I
\.;___._.,.
I

Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

...
iln:prtmt QJqurt of tlt't ,-mttb iltatts

:

jluqittghnt. ~. <If. 211p~~
CHAMBER S O F

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

September 30, 1981
Re:

No. 80-2209

United States v. Ross

Dear John:
The order you propose in your memo of September 29th
is agreeable to me.
Sincerely,
.' !, 1'..(

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

,_,.,

.:§npume

<qcurt 1tf tlp• ~1tfu~ ~fah>g

~ltlllfhtgton.tB.

:

<!f.

/

2ilc?.ll-.;l

CHAMBERS OF

USTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

September 30, 1981

Re: No. 80-2209 - United States v. Ross
Dear John:
The proposed form of order has my approval.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

~

:z;:1f2.J,

~~

~--~r~~·"t:

,, l

...

-

..

~,.
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September 30, 1981

80-2209 United qtates v. Ross

Dear John:
The proposed form of order has my approval.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

------------·-·"---··· '-------------'"'----

.:§ltp"rttttt ~onrl a-f

flrt ~nittlt .;§taftg
~a$Lrbt~fon, ~· <!f. 2ll?J1~

September 30, 1981

MEMO TO:

Justice John Paul Stevens

FROM:

Justice Sandra D. O'Connor

RE:

80-2209 - United States v. Ross
I agree with the proposed form of order.

Perhaps it

would help to add the following language at the end :
"in addition to any other questions
raised in the petition."

Respectfully,

SO'C

cc:

The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice Stewart
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist

-

'•

.§u.puuu (!JC1ttt cf t4t J:uilib .§taftg
~rurfringLtt4 ~.

<!f.

2Ilgi'!.;l

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

October 7, 1981
Re:

No. 80-2209 - United States v. Ross

Dear John:
I agree with the September 29 proposed order.
Regards,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ............... . , 19 .. .

No.

80-2209

UNITED STATES
vs.

ROSS

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMEN'l'

CERT.

HOLD
FOR

G

D

N

POST

DIS

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

AFF·

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

D

Burger, Ch. J ... . ...... .
Brennan, J ........................... .

~~x-k·x··························
White, J .............
Marshall, J
Blackmun, J .....
0

•

0

./

0

0

0

Rehnquist, J.
Stevens, Jo

0

0

O'Connor,
•

•

•

0

••

0

•

••••

0

0

••••••••••••••••

•••••••

0

Powell, Jo

0

0

0.

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

••••••

••

0

••••

0

0

0

0

•

0

••••

0

0

0

0

0

•

•

0

0

0

0

0

0

••

0

0

J •
•••••••

••

••

•••

0

0

••••

0.

0

0

••

0

0

•••••••••

0

•

••••••••

0

••

••

0

••••••

0

0

••

••••

0

•••••

·'

I

November 13, 1981 Conference
List 3, Sheet 4

(

No. 80-2209

'-----'

UNITED STATES

Motion to Dispense with
Printing the Joint Appendix

v.
ROSS
SUMMARY:

The SG, as petr, seeks leave to dispense with the

requirement of a joint appendix.

The SG maintains that the facts

of this search and seizure case are fully set forh in the en bane
CA opinion which already appears in the appendix of the cert petn.
Resp consents to the SG's request.
DISCUSSION:
11/10/81
PJC

Grant.
Caldwell
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No. 80-2209:

u.s.

/

v. Ross

Question Presented
Whether police were required to obtain a warrant to
search a paper bag found

in the trunk of a car that they had

probable cause to search.

Discussion
This
Court.

area

of

law

has

been

very

troubling

for

the

As you have made clear, the Court faces the dual re-

sponsibili ty of

principled decisionmaking

as well

as minimal

institutional unity -- so as to provide daily guidance for the
hundreds of thousands of law enforcement personnel who are expected to abide by this Court's dictates.

-~

...
I see four

alternative ways to resolve this case.

I

list and discuss each.

1.

Robbins theory
This resolution would simply reaffirm Robbins' holding

that search of any closed and opaque container require a warrant.

This position is urged by resp and by the ACLU as ami-

cus.

WJB, BRW, and TM also can be expected to adhere to their

Robbins plurality vote for this theory.
The
character.

advantage

of

this

theory

is

its

"bright

line"

It makes the empirical generalization that persons

have an expectation of privacy in any closed and opaque container.
tion's

People vary in their assessment about this generalizavalidity,

and

hence

its cost

(in

terms of

inaccuracy

/

stemming from protecting packages that embody little or no expectation of privacy).

My own view is that the generalization

probably is quite valid.

I

think one safely can assume that

most closed containers

by their very nature -- do evidence

the owner's expectation of privacy.
I
together

expect you will disagree.

with materials

in

Your Robbins statement,

the Chamber's Robbins file,

makes

clear you view many containers as too flimsy or inconsequential
to support this "privacy of container contents" generalization.
Under this view,

the generalization creates high law enforce-

ment

no

costs

with

corresponding

protection of privacy expectations.

or

offsetting

benefit

from

The "bright line" thus is

-'·

simply too costly to justify whatever administrative savings it
may make possible.
The other great problem with this position is votes.
You have made plain your laudable concern with the Court's institutional responsibility to provide unified guidance in this
area.

Only four Justices wholeheartedly supported the Robbins

theory

last

Term.

One

of

these

votes

--

PS 's

-- may well

change; SOC, one may speculate, is apt to depart from PS's perspective on this

issue.

view and supported

it,

Therefore,

even if you changed your

the Robbins theory probably could not

provide a basis for consensus in this case.

2.

Arkansas v. Sanders theory

This theory reasons that ability to search containers
does not depend on whether a container is or is not in a car.
The

theoretical

framework

is

that

set

forth

(eloquently,

I

think) in Chadwick (requiring warrant for police station search
of

200

lb.

locker

placed

in open car

trunk)

and Arkansas v.

Sanders (requiring warrant for search of green suitcase full of
marihuana

in

taxicab

trunk).

That

is,

whether

a warrant

is

required would depend on whether an expectation of privacy inheres in the container to be searched, not on whether the container was near an auto.

A vote to reverse in this case would

employ this logic but would distinguish the result in Chadwick
and Sanders on the grounds you set forth in your Robbins statement:

that double-locked footlockers and personal luggage con-

~.

vey evidence of an expectation of privacy that a paper bag does
not.

The SG advocates this approach (in the alternative).

SG brief at 9,

14-37.

Although

consistent with Robbins' result

See

this approach could be made
(because the package there was

wrapped and sealed, and hence could be said to exhibit an expectation of privacy), it would require the overruling of Robbins' expansive "all containers are inviolate" reasoning.
The great advantage of this position is that it rests
solidly on sound Fourth Amendment theory:

the centrality of

expectation

reasonableness of

searches.

of

privacy

as

a

guide

to

the

Also, the approach is perfectly consistent with the

result and the reasoning in Chadwick and with your opinion in
Sanders.
A disadvantage of this approach
Because of

the

infinite variety of containers, close factual

distinctions would be unavoidable.
of

privacy"

is administrability.

necessarily

is

The concept of "expectation

abstract.

And

the

competence of

courts to judge general social attitudes about privacy is limited.

Therefore some of the distinctions courts will have to

make will begin to appear arbitrary

(as in this case, for in-

stance, where a zippered leather pouch has been found private,
but a paper bag has been found not private).

This arbitrari-

ness and unpredictability makes law enforcement difficult for
police.

It may

increase

general cynicism

about

the

overall

---.,

state of search and seizure law.

Additionally, there is a pos-

sible economic aspect; the poor may utilize flimsy containers

't':,..

<:'••

::Jo

more frequently because they cannot afford more expensive receptacles.

The Court no doubt should avoid warrant rules that

can be accused of determining privacy rights on grounds that
correlate with income level.
These objections can be exaggerated.

Moreover,

even

if the Court can avoid the need to make such container distinctions
make

in

the

auto context,

such distinctions

presumably

it still will have to

in non-auto search contexts.

To that

extent the problem is inevitable.
Nevertheless,

in the auto context these concerns ap-

parently have moved WJB,
"bright line"
container"
__,.

your

inquiry.

Robbins

preach.

rules

TM, HAB, WHR,

(of some type)

which

and JPS to seek

to avoid the "substantial

Significantly,

concurrence,

no

other

advocated

Justice

this

joined

general

ap-

I therefore conclude that the Sanders theory, despite

its advantages,

is unlikely to produce consensus in this case.

3.
This
that the
(1925)

BRW,

approach

Carroll theory
is

th

--------

rationale of Carroll

It
267

reasons

u.s.

132

(creating the "auto exception") applies also to any con-

tainers found within an auto.

Under this approach, police who

properly could search an auto also properly could search containers that they discover anywhere in the auto.
is advocated by the SG in the alternative

This course

(SG brief at 13-14:

41-47) and by the amici Americans for Effective Law Enforcement

,,

b.

and International Ass'n of Chiefs of Police.

This theory would

require the reversal of Robbins in both reasoning and result.
The

transcendent

popularity. VHAB,\7WHR,
proach.

It

would

clined.

In

this case,

not

advantage

~

of

this

approach

is

its

have already endorsed this ap-

surprise me

if

you would be

SOC was

the fifth

similarly
vote.

I

inalso

would not be surprised if the CJ went along with this theory.
He

concurred

without

public

comment

in

the

Robbins

result.

Privately he expressed his dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule, according to our file, and stated he was "about prepared to support an
room for confusion •
file.

'automobile exception'

"

that leaves little

See 6/26/81 WEB memo in Robbins

This, of course, was before his final decision simply to

concur in the result without comment.

Nonetheless, I think the

prospects

reasonably good,

for

a

6 vote majority are

if you

decide this course is palatable.
The main problem with this course is your opinion in
Sanders.
Sanders

You previously have noted that the holdings in both
and Chadwick can be squared with an expansion of the

auto exception to cover cases like that at bar.

The police in

Sanders and Chadwick suspected the particular container before
there was any contact with a car. 1

Police apprehended the car

1 The factual settings in both cases did involve cars in limited
ways. In Chadwick the police suspected the 200 lb. footlocker -through observation and dog alert -- before the footlocker was
placed (and "arrested") in the open car trunk.
In Sanders the
police had information leading them to suspect the green suitcase
Footnote continued on next page.

·.

only in order to obtain the container, not the car itself.
this case, however, police suspected that Ross'

In

car contained

contraband but had no reason to believe that that contraband
was secreted inside a container that would have enjoyed an expectation of privacy outside of the car.
But

while

consistent

in

result,

Sanders'

reasoning

squarely rejected the precise Carroll theory now under discussion.

,___ 442

U.S.

at 762.

This rejection was made for reasons

that ring very true to my ear in 1982.

See 442 U.S. at 762-65.

I think your Sanders opinion is dead right, and is an important
protection for personal rights.

I am very proud of the United

States' constitutional control on the coercive power of police
authority.

The admittedly high cost of upholding the principle

has measured

its

importance to us as a nation.

Few,

if any,

other countries can boast of such careful regard for individual
liberty and autonomy.

I therefore would grieve over the renun-

ciation of Sanders' reasoning.
Another difficulty with Carroll approach to this case
is the logical tangle that will result from barring warrantless
container searches outside but permitting them inside of cars.
Obviously there will be messy factual lines for
cars

are

searched

just

~'"
...1 .to
oc ~o draw

as containers enter or

7

when

exit an auto.

More troubling is the possibility that police may abuse a Car-

before it was carried to a taxi and placed in the taxi's trunk .

.. .

u.

roll auto container search exception by waiting to pounce until
a suspected container is placed inside a car.
problem in footnote 9 of his Robbins dissent.
2857-58 n.9.

JPS faced this
See 101 S.Ct. at

He stated that:

Of course, a proper application of the automobile exception will uphold a search of a container located in a car only if the police
have probable cause to search the entire car.
If, as in Sanders, the police have probable
cause only as to a suitcase, and not as to the
entire car, then the automobile exception is
inapplicable and a warrant is required unless
some other exigency exists. Thus police would
not be able to avoid a warrant requirement
simply by waiting for the suspect to place an
object in a car and then invoking the automobile exception. If, however, the occupants of
a car have an opportunity to take contraband
out of a sui tease and secrete it somewhere
else in a car, see Sanders .
{Blackmun,
J., dissenting), then I would conclude that
police have probable cause to search the entire car, including the suitcase, without a
warrant {emphasis added).
This approach has its difficulties.

It may take but a

few seconds to "take contraband out of a suitcase and secrete
it .

.

.

."

Therefore the potential for police to abuse this

extension of the auto exception seems quite large, given that
most contraband is movable and that virtually everything in our
society moves by motor vehicle.

Police need only watch a sus-

pect container of contraband enter a car and then wait a few
seconds.

Then they can inspect without a warrant a container

that they could have searched only with a warrant a few seconds
earlier.
roll
well.

Thus the "bright line" advantage carried by the Car-

theory

brings

some

costs

{in

terms of

consistency)

as

\

Y.

4.
Chimel
within

the

v.

Chimel/Belton theory

California

"immediate

control"

permits
of

an

searches

of

the

~ ested pers~ .

area
Last

term Belton extended Chimel to hold that a search incident to
arrest permits police to search the passenger compartments of
car -- including any containers and closed glove compartments.
Belton's

thinking

was

that

the

passenger

compartment

is

the

region of an arrestee's "immediate control" during an arrest of
one from a car.

-

Resp Ross was arrested in this case.

Thus Chimel and

Belton could be extended to assert that the trunk, as well as
the passenger compartment, is within the Chimel "immediate control" area.
No
though

party

advocates

this

it offers some attractions.

theory

in

this

One advantage

case,

even

is that it

would permit reversal in this case on grounds that are consistent with reasoning and result in Chadwick and Sanders.

This

Chimel logic also would permit Robbins to remain undisturbed:

@Ob~

explicitly did not

S.Ct. at 2847 n.3.

involve a lawful arrest.

See 101

These doctrinal consistencies, however, are

offset by two other problems.
First, this extension would stretch the Chimel reasoning to the breaking point.

It is very difficult to say with a

straight face that the interior of a locked trunk is within the
area of immediate control of one just arrested from the passenger compartment.

-

10.

Perhaps more
focus of the search

importantly,

this

justification and

the search is arrest.

arrest

to

related

words,

such a rule could tempt police

to

the

splits

the search scope.

rationale for
be

reasoning

the
The

But nothing requires the

container

suspicion.

In other

into making

pretextual

arrests for trivial traffic offenses, simply to gain the right
to search containers in a car and its trunk.
used

Justice Stevens

logic of this sort to criticize effectively this Chimel

approach in his Robbins dissent.

See 101 s.ct. at 2858-59.

Conclusion
In the best of all possible worlds, .!!!.Y_ personal view
is that the Robbins approach should be reaffirmed and thus the
CADC judgment in this case should itself be affirmed.

But you

have made clear your view that insubstantial containers in fact
do not

inevitably evidence

an expectation of privacy.

Given

your belief that paper bags may be searched without a warrant,
the CADC must be reversed.
In the best of all possible worlds, I expect that
would prefer

~

to reverse on the Arkansas v. Sanders theory of

container-type-by-container-type of weighing of privacy interests.

But this approach, despite its doctrinal appeal, h as a

very slight chance of commanding majority support.
The second next position is expansion of the Carroll
auto exception.

This requires overruling the result in Robbins

and the reasoning in Arkansas v. Sanders, and it is not free of

I

,. .-,

~_ ~
rv~-

11.

logical ironies.

But in general it seems a workable approach.

Importantly, it stands a good chance of winning 6-3 support.
Finally, I think the Court should reject any reliance
on a Chimel theory.

No party advocates this view.

It would

tear doctrine and reduce personal liberties with the advantage
only of preserving consistency with Chadwick, Sanders, and Robbins.
You may wish to remain flexible at Conference.

A pos-

sible course would be to express a preference for what I have
have labelled the Sanders theory, but to mention that you will
join 4 or 5 to reverse on a Carroll approach.
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CHAM BE R S OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

March 3, 1982
.. ,".,.
"~

Dear Chief:
My vote in this case is to reverse.
I would reach this conclusion under the analysis of my
concurring opinion last Term in Robbins.
I agree with the
SG that one has no reasonable expectat1on of privacy in a
paper bag of the type involved in this case. It was not
sealed and there was no other evidence of a privacy
expectation.
There are five votes to adopt the Carroll automobile
exception: that wherever there is probable cause to search
an automobile, the entire vehicle and all of its contents
may be searched without a warrant. I do not think this
would require reversal of Chadwick and Sanders for the
reasons you and I have stated. It would require reversal of
Robbins, as well as a rejection of the line of reasoning
stated in my concurring opinion in that case.
In these circumstances, I must decide whether to adhere
to the views I expressed last Term in Robbins or join an
opinion that defines the scope of the automobile search as
indicated above.
I am not at rest as between these choices
and will await the writing of the Court opinion •

. ·i

..

I

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
lfp/ss
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Dear Chief:
iF

in this case is to reverse.
I woul~ reach this conclusion under the analysis of my
concurring opinion last Term in Robbins. I aqree with the
SG that one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
paper bag of the type involved tn. this case. It was not
sealed and there was no other e.vidence of a privacy
expectation.
~
~here are five votes to adopt the Carroll automobile
exception: that wherever there is Probable cause to search
an automobile, the entire vehicle and all of its contents
may be searched without a warrant. t do not think this
would require reversal of Chadwick and Sanders for the
reasons you and I have stated. It would require reversal of
Robbins, as well as a rejection of the line of reasoning
stated in my concurring opinion in that case.

In these circumstances, I must decide whether to adhere
to the views I expressed last Term in Robbins or join an
opinion that defines the scope of the automobile search as
indicated above. I am not at rest as between these choices
and will await the writing of the Court opinion.
Sincerely

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 80-2209

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ALBERT ROSS, JR.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, the Court held
that a warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police
officers who had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court in Carroll did not explicitly address the scope of the search that is permissible.
In this case, we consider the extent to which police officerswho have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have
p~ cause to believe that contraband is concealed somewhere within it-may conduct a probing search of compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are
not in plain view. We hold that they may conduct a search of
the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant "particularly describing the place to be
searched." '
I
In the evening of November 27, 1978, an informant who
had previously proved to be reliable telephoned Detective
'"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized. " U. S. Canst., Arndt. 4.
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Marcum of the District of Columbia Police Department and
told him that an individual known as "Bandit" was selling
narcotics kept in the trunk of a car parked at 439 Ridge
Street. The informant stated that he had just observed
"Bandit" complete a sale and that "Bandit" had told him that
additional narcotics were in the trunk. The informant gave
Marcum a detailed description of "Bandit" and stated that the
car was a "purplish maroon" Chevrolet Malibu with District
of Columbia license plates.
Accompanied by Detective Cassidy and Sergeant Gonzales, Marcum immediately drove to the area and found a maroon Malibu parked in front of 439 Ridge Street. A license
check disclosed that the car was registered to Albert Ross; a
computer check on Ross revealed that he fit the informant's
description and used the alias "Bandit." In two passes
through the neighborhood the officers did not observe anyone
matching the informant's description. To avoid alerting persons on the street, they left the area.
The officers returned five minutes later and observed the
maroon Malibu turning off Ridge Street onto Fourth Street.
They pulled alongside the Malibu, noticed that the driver
matched the informant's description, and stopped the car.
Marcum and Cassidy told the driver-later identified as Albert Ross, the respondent in this action-to get out of the vehicle. While they searched Ross, Sergeant Gonzales discovered a bullet on the car's front seat. He searched the
interior of the car and found a pistol in the glove compartment. Ross then was arrested and handcuffed. Detective
Cassidy took Ross' keys and opened the trunk, where he
found a closed brown paper bag. He opened the bag and discovered a number of glassine bags containing a white powder. Cassidy replaced the bag, closed the trunk, and drove
the car to Headquarters.
At the police station Cassidy thoroughly searched the car.
In addition to the "lunch-type" brown paper bag, Cassidy
found in the trunk a zippered red leather pouch. He un-
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zipped the pouch and discovered $3,200 in cash. The police
laboratory later determined that the powder in the paper bag
was heroin. No warrant was obtained.
Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a). Prior to trial,
he moved to suppress the heroin found in the paper bag and
the currency found in the leather pouch. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion to suppress. The heroin and currency were introduced in evidence
at trial and Ross was convicted.
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction. It held that the police had probable cause to stop
and search Ross' car and that, under Carroll v. United
States, supra, and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, the
officers lawfully could search the automobile-including its
trunk-without a warrant. The court considered separately, however, the warrantless search of the two containers
found in the trunk. On the basis of Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U. S. 753, the court concluded that the constitutionality
of a warrantless search of a container found in an automobile
depends on whether the owner possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. Applying that test, the
court held that the warrantless search of the paper bag was
valid but the search of the leather pouch was not. The court
remanded for a new trial at which the items taken from the
paper bag, but not those from the leather pouch, could be
admitted. 2
The entire Court of Appeals then voted to rehear the case
en bane. A majority of the court rejected the panel's conclusion that a distinction of constitutional significance existed
between the two containers found in respondent's trunk; it
2
The court rejected the Government's argument that the warrantless
search of the leather pouch was justified as incident to respondent's arrest.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 137a. The Government has not challenged this
holding.
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held that the police should not have opened either container
without first obtaining a warrant. The court reasoned:
"No specific, well-delineated exception called to our
attention permits the police to dispense with a warrant
to open and search 'unworthy' containers. Moreover,
we believe that a rule under which the validity of a warrantless search would turn on judgments about the durability of a container would impose an unreasonable and
unmanageable burden on police and courts. For these
reasons, and because the Fourth Amendment protects
all persons, not just those with the resources or fastidiousness to place their effects in containers that decisionmakers would rank in the luggage line, we hold that the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement forbids the
warrantless opening of a closed, opaque paper bag to the
same extent that it forbids the warrantless opening of a
small unlocked suitcase or a zippered leather pouch."
655 F. 2d 1159, 1161 (CADC 1981) (footnote omitted).
The en bane Court of Appeals considered, and rejected, the
argument that it was reasonable for the police to open both
the paper bag and the leather pouch because they were entitled to conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle in
which the two containers were found. The majority concluded that this argument was foreclosed by Sanders.
Three dissenting judges interpreted Sanders differently. 3
Other courts also have read the Sanders opinion in different
Judge Tamm, the author of the original panel opinion, reiterated the
view that Sanders prohibited the warrantless search of the leather pouch
but not the search of the paper bag. Judge Robb agreed that this result
was compelled by Sanders, although he stated that in his opinion "the right
to search an automobile should include the right to open any container
found within the automobile, just as the right to search a lawfully arrested
prisoner carries with it the right to examine the contents of his wallet and
any envelope found in his pocket, and the right to search a room includes
authority to open and search all the drawers and containers found within
3
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ways. 4 Moreover, disagreement concerning the proper in- J
terpretation of Sanders was at least partially responsible for
the fact that Robbins v. California,-- U. S. --,was decided last Term without a Court opinion.
There is, however, no dispute among judges about the importance of striving for clarification in this area of the law.
For countless vehicles are stopped on highways and public
streets every day and our cases demonstrate that it is not uncommon for police officers to have probable cause to believe
that contraband may be found in a stopped vehicle. In every
such case a conflict is presented between the individual's constitutionally protected interest in privacy and the public interest in effective law enforcement. No single rule of law
can resolve every conflict, but our conviction that clarification is feasible led us to grant the Government's petition for
certiorari in this case and to invite the parties to address the
question whether the decision in Robbins should be reconsidered. - - U. S. - - .
II

We begin with a review of the decision in Carroll itself.
In the fall of 1921, federal prohibition agents obtained evidence that George Carroll and John Kiro were "bootleggers"
who frequently traveled between Grand Rapids and Detroit
the room." 655 F. 2d, at 1180. Judge MacKinnon concurred with Judge
Tamm that Sanders did not prohibit the warrantless search of the paper
bag. Concerning the leather pouch, he agreed with Judge Wilkey, who
dissented on the ground that Sanders should not be applied retroactively.
' Many courts have held that Sanders requires that a warrant be obtained only for personal luggage and other "luggage-type" containers.
See, e. g., United States v. Goshorn, 628 F. 2d 697 (CAl 1980); United
States v. Brown, 635 F. 2d 1207 (CA6 1980); United States v. Jiminez, 626
F. 2d 39 (CA 7 1980). One court has held that Sanders does not apply if the
police have probable cause to search an entire vehicle and not merely an
isolated container within it. Cf. State v. Bible, 389 So. 2d 42 (La. 1980),
remanded, U. S. ; State v. Hernandez, 408 So. 2d 911 (La. 1981);
see also United States v. Ross, 655 F. 2d, at 1180 (Robb, J., dissenting).
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in an Oldsmobile Roadster. 5 On December 15, 1921, the
agents unexpectedly encountered Carroll and Kiro driving
west on that route in that car. The officers gave pursuit,
stopped the roadster on the highway, and requested Carroll
and Kiro to get out of the car.
No contraband was visible in the front seat of the Oldsmobile and the rear portion of the roadster was closed. One of
the agents raised the rumble seat but found no liquor. He
raised the seat cushion and again found nothing. The officer
then struck at the "lazyback" of the seat and noticed that it
was "harder than upholstery ordinarily is in those backs."
267 U. S., at 174. He tore open the seat cushion and discovered 68 bottles of gin and whiskey concealed inside. No warrant had been obtained for the search.
Carroll and Kiro were convicted of transporting intoxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. On
review of those convictions, this Court ruled that the warrantless search of the roadster was reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In an extensive opinion
written by Chief Justice Taft, the Court held:
"On reason and authority the true rule is that if the
search and seizure without a warrant are made upon
probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be con• On September 29, 1921, Carroll and Kiro met the agents in Grand Rapids and agreed to sell them three cases of whiskey. The sale was not consummated, however, possibly because Carroll learned the agents' true
identity. In October, the agents discovered Carroll and Kiro driving the
Oldsmobile Roadster on the road to Detroit, which was known as an active
center for the introduction of illegal liquor into this country. The agents
followed the roadster as far as East Lansing, but there abandoned the
chase.
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strued in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner
which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens." !d., at 149.
The Court explained at length the basis for this rule. The
Court noted that historically warrantless searches of vessels,
wagons, and carriages-as opposed to fixed premises such as
a home or other building-had been considered reasonable by
Congress. After reviewing legislation enacted by Congress
between 1789 and 1799, 6 the Court stated:
"Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment we find in the first Congress, and in
the following Second and Fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a
dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course
of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel
where they readily could be put out of reach of a search
warrant." ld., at 151.
The Court reviewed additional legislation passed by Congress 7 and again noted that
"the guaranty' of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Govern6
The legislation authorized customs officials to search any ship or vessel
without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that it concealed
goods subject to duty. The same legislation required a warrant for
searches of dwelling places. 267 U. S., at 150-151.
' In particular, the Court noted an 1815 statute that permitted customs
officers not only to board and search vessels without a warrant "but also to
stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom
they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty or
had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to
law." Id., at 151.
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ment, as recognizing a necessary difference between a
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be
obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought." I d., at 153.
Thus, since its earliest days Congress had recognized the
impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the
transportation of contraband goods. 8 It is this impracticability, viewed in historical perspective, that provided the
basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an automobile in transit, the Court recognized that an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit
substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable. 9
8

In light of this established history, individuals always had been on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise
to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those facts.
9
Subsequent cases make clear that the decision in Carroll was not based
on the fact that the only course available to the police was an immediate
search. As Justice Harlan later recognized, although a failure to seize a
moving automobile believed to contain contraband might deprive officers of
the illicit goods, once a vehicle itself has been stopped the exigency does
not necessarily justify a warrantless search. Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U. S. 42, 62--M (opinion of Harlan, J.). The Court in Chambers, however-with only Justice Harlan dissenting-refused to adopt a rule that
would permit a warrantless seizure but prohibit a warrantless search.
The Court held that if police officers have probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct an
immediate search of the contents of that vehicle. "For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a
car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
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In defining the nature of this "exception" to the general
rule that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used," id., at 156, the Court in
Carroll emphasized the importance of the requirement that
officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.
"Having thus established that contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other
vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come
now to consider under what circumstances such search
may be made. It would be intolerable and unreasonable
if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travellers may
be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to
Amendment." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S., at 52.
The Court also has held that if an immediate search on the street is permissible without a warrant, a search soon thereafter at the police station is
permissible if the vehicle is impounded. Chambers, supra; Texas v.
White, 423 U. S. 67. These decisions are based on the practicalities of the
situations presented and a realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a contrary rule would provide for privacy interests. Given the
scope of the initial intrusion caused by a seizure of an automobile-which
often could leave the occupants stranded on the highway-the Court rejected an inflexible rule that would force police officers in every case either
to post guard at the vehicle while a warrant is obtained or to tow the vehicle itself to the station. Similarly, if an immediate search on the scene
could be conducted, but not one at the station if the vehicle is impounded,
police often simply would search the vehicle on the street-at no advantage
to the occupants, yet possibly at certain cost to the police. The rules as
applied in particular cases may appear unsatisfactory. They reflect, however, a reasoned application of the more general rule that if an individual
gives the police probable cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contraband, he loses the right to proceed on his way without official interference.
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come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country,
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free
passage without interruption or search unless there is
known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying
contraband or illegal merchandise." Id., at 153-154.
Moreover, the probable cause determination must be based
on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant
by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith
of the police officers. "'[A]s we have seen, good faith is not
enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be
grounded on facts within knowledge of the [officer], which in
the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable.'"
Id., at 161-162 (quoting Director General v. Kastenbaum,
263

u. s. 25, 28).

10

It is also clear that the doctrine of Carroll itself applies
only to a vehicle stopped "in the course of transportation."
267 U. S., at 149. Nothing in the opinion in that case suggests that an automobile parked in a private driveway could
be searched without a warrant, absent other circumstances
justifying a warrantless search. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443.u In short, the exception to the warrant
requirement established in Carroll-the scope of which we
10

After reviewing the relevant authorities at some length, the Court concluded that the probable cause requirement was satisfied in the case before
it. The Court held that "the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which
they stopped and searched." /d., at 162. Cf. Brinegar v. United States,
338 U. S. 160, 176-177; Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 102.
11
At page 6 of their brief amicus curiae, the Americans for Effective
Law Enforcement and the International Association of Chiefs of Police also
state that it is clear that the Carroll exception does not extend to a house
trailer or camper used for residential purposes.
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consider in this case-applies only to vehicles stopped in the
course of transportation and to searches that are supported
by probable cause. 12 In this class of cases, a search is not un- ,
reasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of
a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been
obtained. 13

III
The rationale justifying a warrantless search of an automobile that is believed to be transporting contraband arguably
applies with equal force to any movable container that is believed to be carrying an illicit substance. That argument,
however, was squarely rejected in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1.
Chadwick involved the warrantless search of a 200-pound
12

See Husky v. United States, 282 U. S. 694; Scher v. United States, 305
U. S. 251; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160; Henry v. United
States, 361 U. S. 98; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U. S. 216; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42; Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67; Colorado v.
Bannister, 449 U. S. 1.
Warrantless searches of automobiles have been upheld in a variety of
factual contexts quite different from that presented in Carroll. Cf.
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433;
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364. Many of these searches do not
require a showing of probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband.
We are not called upon-and do not-consider in this case the scope of the
warrantless search that is permitted in those cases.
13
As the Court in Carroll concluded:
"We here find the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizures of
liquor in transport in vehicles. It is certainly a reasonable distinction. It
gives the owner of an automobile or other vehicle seized under Section 26,
in absence of probable cause, a right to have restored to him the automobile, it protects him under the Weeks and Amos cases from use of the liquor
as evidence against him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to
damages. On the other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the Government and its officials are given the opportunity which they should have,
to make the investigation necessary to trace reasonably suspected contraband goods and to seize them." 267 U. S., at 156.
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footlocker. Federal railroad officials in San Diego became
suspicious when they noticed that a brown footlocker loaded
onto a train bound for Boston was unusually heavy and leaking talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor
of marijuana. Narcotics agents met the train in Boston and
a trained police dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance inside the footlocker. While the agents awaited further developments, respondent Chadwick arrived and the
footlocker was placed in the trunk of ~ck's automobile.
At that point, while the trunk of the c~n and
before the en ·ne had oeen s arted, the agents seized the
foot ocker. They later searched the footlocker without a
warrant and discovered a large quantity of marijuana.
In a subsequent criminal proceeding, Chadwick claimed
that the warrantless search of the footlocker violated the
Fourth Amendment. In the District Court, the Government
argued that as soon as the footlocker was placed in the automobile a warrantless search was permissible under Carroll.
The District Court rejected that argument, 14 and the Government did not pursue it on appeal. 15 Rather, the Government
contended in this Court that the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment applied only to searches of homes and
The District Court noted:
"In this case, there was no nexus between the search and the automobile,
merely a coincidence. The challenged search in this case was one of a footlocker, not an automobile. The search took place not in an automobile, but
in [the federal building]. The only connection that the automobile had to
this search was that, prior to its seizure, the footlocker was placed on the
floor of an automobile's open trunk." United States v. Chadwick, 393 F.
Supp. 763, 772 (Mass. 1975).
15
This Court specifically noted: "The Government does not contend that
the footlocker's brief contact with Chadwick's car makes this an automobile
search, but it is argued that the rationale of our automobile search cases
demonstrates the reasonableness of permitting warrantless searches of
luggage; the Government views such luggage as analagous to motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes." 433 U. S., at 11-12.
14

80-2209-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. ROSS

13

other "core" areas of privacy. The Court unanimously rejected that contention. 16 Writing for the Court, THE CHIEF
JUSTICE stated:
"[I]f there is little evidence that the Framers intended ·
the Warrant Clause to operate outside the home, there is
no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from protection of the Clause all searches occurring outside the
home. The absence of a contemporary outcry against
warrantless searches in public places was because, aside
from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless
searches were not a large issue in colonial America.
Thus, silence in the historical record tells us little about
the Framers' attitude toward application of the Warrant
Clause to the search of respondents' footlocker. What
we do know is that the Framers were men who focused
on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth
Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which
would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it
birth." 433 U. S., at &--9 (footnote omitted).
The Court ir/i;~adwick}specifically rejected the argument
that the warrantless search was "reasonable" because a footlocker has some of the mobile characteristics that support
warrantless searches of automobiles. The Court recognized
that "a person's expectations of privl!_cy in personal luggage
are substantially greater than in an automobile," id., at 13,
and noted that the practical problems associated with the
temporary detention of a piece of luggage during the period
of time necessary to obtain a warrant are significantly less
than those associated with the detention of an automobile.
!d., at 13, n. 7. In ruling that the warrantless search of the
footlocker was unjustified, the Court reaffirmed the general
principle that closed packages and containers may not be
searched without a warrant. Cf. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S.
16

See id., at 17

(BLACKMUN,

J., dissenting).

I
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727; United States v. Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249. In sum, the
Court in Chadwick declined to extend the rationale of the
"automobile exception" to permit a warrantless search of any
movable container found in a public place. 17
The facts in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, w~
ilar to those in Chadwick. In Sanders, a Little Rock police
o~ation from a reliable informant that
Sanders would arrive at the local airport on a specified flight
that afternoon carrying a green suitcase containing marijuana. The officer went to the airport. Sanders arrived on
schedule and retrieved a green suitcase from the airline baggage service. Sanders gave the suitcase to a waiting companion who placed it in the trunk of a taxi. Sanders and his
companion drove off in the cab; police officers followed and
stopped the taxi several blocks from the airport. The officers opened the trunk, seized the suitcase, and searched it on
the scene without a warrant. As predicted, the suitcase contained marijuana.
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless
search of the suitcase was impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment, and this Court affirmed. As in Chadwick, the
mere fact that the suitcase had been placed the trunk of
the vehicle did not render the automobile exception of Carroll applicable; the police had robable cause to seize the suite~ before it was placed in the trun o t e ca and did not
have probable cause to search the taxi itself. 18 Since the

rn

17
The Court concluded that there is a significant difference between the
seizure of a sealed package and a subsequent search of its contents; the
search of the container in that case was "a far greater intrusion into Fourth
Amendment values than the impoundment of the footlocker. " I d., at 13,
n. 8. A temporary seizure of a package or piece of luggage often may be
accomplished without as significant an intrusion upon the individual-and
without as great a burden on the police-as in the case of the seizure of an
automobile. See n. 9, supra.
18
The Arkansas Supreme Court carefully reviewed the facts of the case
and concluded: "The information supplied to the police by the confidential
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suitcase had been placed in the trunk, no danger existed that
its contents could have been secreted elsewhere in the vehicle. 19 As THE CHIEF JusTICE noted in his opinion concurring
in the judgment:
"Because the police officers had probable cause to believe that respondent's green suitcase contained marijuana before it was placed in the trunk of the taxicab,
their duty to obtain a search warrant before opening it is
clear under United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1
(1977).

*

*

*

Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage being transported by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the
automobile in which it was being carried, that was the
suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship between the automobile and the contraband was purely coincidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase
was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time of
respondent's arrest does not turn this into an 'automobile' exception case. The Court need say no more."
Id., at 76&-767.
The Court in Sanders did not, however, rest its decision
solely on the authority of Chadwick. In rejecting the State's
argument that the warrantless search of the suitcase was jusinformant [was] adequate to support the State's claim that the police had
probable cause to believe that appellant's green suitcase contained a controlled substance when the police confiscated the suitcase and opened it."
262 Ark. 595, 599, 559 S. W. 2d 704, 706 (1977). The court also noted: "The
evidence in this case supports the conclusion that the relationship between
the suitcase and the taxicab [was] coincidental." Id. , at 600, n. 2, 559
S.W. 2d, at 706.
19
Moreover, none of the practical difficulties associated with the detention a vehicle on a public highway that made the immediate search in Carroll reasonable could justify an immediate search of the suitcase, since the
officers had no interest in detaining the taxi or its driver.
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tified on the ground that it had been taken from an automobile lawfully stopped on the street, the Court b~ug- ;
g~ that a warrantless search of ~,...found in an
automobile could never be sustained as part of a warrantless
search of the automobile itself. 20 The Court did not suggest
that it mattered whether probable cause existed to search
the entire vehicle. It is clear, however, that in neither
Chadwick nor Sanders did the police have probable cause to
search the vehicle or anything within it except the footlocker
in the former case and the green suitcase in the latter.
Robbins v. California, - - U. S. - - , however, was a
cas~cion was not directed at a specific container. In that case the Court for the first time was forced
to consider whether police officers who are entitled to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile stopped on a public roadway may open a container found within the vehicle.
In the early morning of January 5, 1975, police officers
stopped Robbins' station wagon because he was driving erratically. Robbins got out of the car, but later returned to
obtain the vehicle's registration papers. When he opened
the car door, the officers smelled marijuana smoke. One of
the officers searched Robbins and discovered a vial of liquid;
in a search of the interior of the car the officer found marijuana. The police officers then opened the tailgate of the
station wagon and raised the cover of a recessed luggage
20

The Court stated that "the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other parcels depends not at all upon whether they
are seized from an automobile." 442 U. S., at 764, n. 13. This general
rule was limited only by the observation that "[n]ot all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a
kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred
from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a
package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the need for a warrant." Ibid.
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compartment. In the compartment they found two packages
wrapped in green opaque plastic. The police unwrapped the
packages and discovered a large amount of marijuana in each.
Robbins was charged with various drug offenses and
moved to suppress the contents of the plastic packages.
The California Court of Appeal held that "[s]earch of the
automobile was proper when the officers learned that appellant was smoking marijuana when they stopped him,' '21 and
that the warrantless search of the packages was justified because "the contents of the packages could have been inferred
from their outward appearance, so that appellant could not
have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
the contents." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780,
783 (1980).
This Court reversed. Writing for a plurality, Justice
Stewart rejected the argument that the outward appearance
of the packages precluded Robbins from having a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their contents. He also squarely
rejected the argument that there is a constitutional distinction between searches of luggage and searches of "less worthy" containers. Justice Stewart reasoned that all containers are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment unless
their contents are in plain view. The plurality concluded
that the warrantless search was impermissible because
Chadwick and Sanders had established that "a closed piece of
luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally
protected to the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage
found anywhere else." --U.S., at--.
In a concurring opinion, JUSTICE PowELL, the author of
the Court's opinion in Sanders, stated that "[t]he plurality's
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes
substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating
any significant values of privacy." /d., at - - . 22 He noted
2

'
22

103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 39, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782 (1980).
"While the plurality's blanket warrant requirement does not even pur-

t .

;/~
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that possibly "the controlling question should be the scope of
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement," id., at
- - , and explained that under that view
"when the police have probable cause to search an automobile, rather than only to search a particular container
that fortuitously is located in it, the exigencies that allow
the police to search the entire automobile without a warrant support the warrantless search of every container
found therein. See post, at - - and n. 13 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with
the holdings in Chad'Wick and Sanders, neither of which
is an 'automobile case,' because the police there had
probable cause to search the double-locked footlocker
and the suitcase respectively before either came near an
automobile." Ibid.
The parties in Robbins had not pressed that argument, however, and JUSTICE POWELL concluded that institutional conport to protect any privacy interest, it would impose substantial new burdens on law enforcement. Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in
the course of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the
conscientious policeman would be required to take the object to a magistrate, fill out the appropriate forms, await the decision, and finally obtain a
warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while the warrant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer from his
normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn from
the public's limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes, is justified when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests. In my
view, the plurality's requirement cannot be so justified. The aggregate
burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable cause to
search the most trivial container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the advancement of important Fourth Amendment values." - U. S., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring).
The substantial burdens on law enforcement identified by JUSTICE PowELL would, of course, not be affected by the character of the container
found during an automobile search. No comparable practical problems
arise when the official suspicion is confined to a particular piece of luggage,
as in Chadwick and Sanders. Cf. n. 19, supra.
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straints made it inappropriate to re-examine basic doctrine
without full adversary presentation. He concurred in the
judgment, since it was supported-although not compelledby the Court's opinion in Sanders, and stated that a future
case might present a better opportunity for thorough consideration of the basic principles in this troubled area.
That case has arrived. Unlike Chadwick and Sanders, in
this case police officers had probable cause to search respondent's entire vehicle. 23 Unlike Robbins, in this case the parties have squarely addressed the question whether, in the
course of a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile,
police are entitled to open containers found within the vehicle. We n~stion. Its answer is determined by the scope of the search that is authorized by the excep Ion to tlie warrant requirement set forth in Carroll.
IV
In Carroll itself, the whiskey that the prohibition agents
seized was not in plain view. It was discovered only after an
officer opened the rumble seat and tore open the upholstery
of the lazyback. The Court did not find the scope of the
search unreasonable. Having stopped Carroll and Kiro on a
public road and subjected them to the indignity of a vehicle
The en bane Court of Appeals stated that "[b]ased on the tip the police
received, Ross's car was properly stopped and searched, and the pouch and
bag were properly seized." 655 F. 2d, at 1168 (footnote omitted). The
court explained:
"[W]e believe it clear that the police had ample and reasonable cause to
stop Ross and to search his car. The informer had supplied accurate information on prior occasions, and he was an eyewitness to sales of narcotics
by Ross. He said he had just seen Ross take narcotics from the trunk of
his car in making a sale and heard him say he possessed additional narcotics." Id., at 1168, n. 22.
The court further noted that "[i]n this case, the informant told the police
that Ross had narcotics in the trunk of his car. No specific container was
identified." I d., at 1166.
23
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search-which the Court found to be a reasonable intrusion
on their privacy because based on probable cause that their
vehicle was transporting contraband-prohibition agents
were entitled to tear open a portion of the roadster itself.
The scope of the search was no greater than a magistrate
could have authorized by issuing a warrant based on the
probable cause that justified the search. Since such a warrant could have authorized the agents to open the rear portion of the roadster and to rip the upholstery in their search
for concealed whiskey, the search was constitutionally
permissible.
In Chambers v. Maroney the police found weapons and
stolen property "concealed in a compartment under the dashboard." 399 U. S., at 44. No suggestion was made that the
scope of the search was impermissible. It would be illogical
to assume that the outcome of Chambers-or the outcome of
Carroll itself-would have been different if the police had
found the secreted contraband enclosed within a secondary
container and had opened that container without a warrant.
If it was reasonable for prohibition agents to rip open the upholstery in Carroll, it certainly would have been reasonable
for them to look into a burlap sack stashed inside; if it was
reasonable to open the concealed compartment in Chambers,
it would have been equally reasonable to open a paper bag
crumpled within it. A contrary rule could produce absurd
results inconsistent with the decision in Carroll itself.
In its application of Carroll, this Court in fact has sustained warrantless searches of containers found during a lawful search of an automobile. In Husty v. United States, 282
U. S. 694, the Court upheld a warrantless seizure of whiskey
found during a search of an automobile, some of which was
discovered in "whiskey bags" that could have contained other
goods. 24 In Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251, federal of24
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked the police officer
who had conducted the search: "Isn't it possible to put other goods in a bag
that has the resemblance of a whiskey bag?" The officer responded: "I
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fleers seized and searched packages of unstamped liquor
found in the trunk of an automobile searched without a warrant. As described by a police officer who participated in
the search: "I turned the handle and opened the trunk and
found the trunk completely filled with packages wrapped in
brown paper, and tied with twine; I think somewhere around
thirty packages, each one containing six bottles." 25 In these
cases it was not contended that police officers needed a warrant to open the whiskey bags or to unwrap the brown paper
packages. The fact that no such argument was even made
illuminates the profession's understanding of the scope of the
search permitted under Carroll. 26 Indeed, prior to the decisions in Chadwick and Sanders, courts routinely had held
that containers and packages found during a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile also could be searched without a warrant. 'l:1
suppose it is. I did not think of that at that time. I knew it was whiskey,
I was sure it was." App., O.T. 1930, No. 477, p. 27.
25
App., o·.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 33. The brief of then Solicitor General
Robert Jackson noted that the items searched "were wrapped in very
heavy brown wrapping paper with at least two wrappings and with a heavy
cord around them cross-wise so that they could readily be lifted." Brief
for United States, O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 6.
26
It is noteworthy that the early legislation on which the Court relied in
Carroll concerned the enforcement of laws imposing duties on imported
merchandise. See nn. 6 and 7, supra. Presumably such merchandise was
shipped then in containers of various kinds, just as it is today. Since Congress had authorized warrantless searches of vessels and beasts for imported merchandise, it is inconceivable that it intended a customs officer to
obtain a warrant for every package discovered during the search; certainly
Congress intended customs officers to open shipping containers when necessary and not merely to examine the exterior of cartons or boxes in which
smuggled goods might be concealed. During virtually the entire history of
our country-whether contraband was transported in a horse drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modem automobile-it has been assumed that a
lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of any container that
might conceal the object of the search.
27
See, e. g., United States v. Soriano, 497 F. 2d 147, 149-150 (CA5 1974)
(en bane); United States v. Vento , 533 F. 2d 838, 867, n. 101 (CA3 1976);
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As we have stated, the decision in Carroll was based on
the Court's appraisal of practical considerations viewed in the
perspective of history. It is therefore significant that the
practical consequences of the Carroll decision would be
largely nullified if the permissible scope of a warrantless
search of an automobile did not include containers and packages found inside the vehicle. Contraband goods rarely are
strewn across the trunk or floor of a car; since by their very
nature such goods must be withheld from public view, they
rarely can be placed in an automobile unless they are enclosed within some form of container. The Court in Carroll
held that "contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for
without a warrant." 267 U. S., at 153 (emphasis added).
As we noted in Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 104, the
decision in Carroll "merely relaxed the requirements for a
warrant on grounds of impracticability." It neither broadened nor limited the scope of a lawful search based on probable cause.
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the
entire area in which the object of the search may be found
and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. 28
United States v. Tramunti, 513 F. 2d 1087, 1104 (CA21975); United States
v. Issod, 508 F. 2d 990, 993 (CA71974); United States v. Evans, 481 F. 2d
990, 994 (CA9 1973); United States v. Bowman, 487 F. 2d 1229 (CAlO
1973). Many courts continued to apply this rule following the decision in
Chadwick. Cf. United States v. Milhollan, 599 F. 2d 518, 52&-527 (CA3
1979); United States v. Gaultney, 581 F. 2d 1137, 1144-1145 (CA5 1978);
United States v. Finnegan, 568 F. 2d 637, 640-641 (CA9 1977). In ruling
that police could search luggage and other containers found during a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile, courts often assumed that the
"automobile exception" of Carroll applied whenever a container in an automobile was believed to contain contraband. That view, of course, has
since been qualified by Chadwick and Sanders.
28
In describing the permissible scope of a search of a home pursuant to a
warrant, Professor LaFave notes:
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Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home
for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets,
chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might
be found. A warrant to open a footlocker to search for marijuana would also authorize the opening of packages found inside. A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search
of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object of
the search. When a legitimate search is under way, and
when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined,
nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in
the case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand. 29
This rule applies equally to all containers, as indeed we believe it must. One point on which the Court was in virtual
unanimous agreement in Robbins was that a constitutional
"Places within the described premises are not excluded merely because
some additional act of entry or opening may be required. 'In countless
cases in which warrants described only the land and the buildings, a search
of desks, cabinets, closets and similar items has been permitted.'" 2
LaFave, Search and Seizure 152 (1978) (quoting Massey v. Commonwealth, 305 S. W. 2d 755, 756 (Ky. 1957)).
29
The practical considerations that justify a warrantless search of an
automobile continue to apply until the entire search of the automobile and
its contents has been completed. Arguably, the entire vehicle itself could
be searched without a warrant, with all containers found during that
search then taken to a magistrate. Certainly no privacy interest is
served, however, by prohibiting police from opening immediately a container in which the object of the search may most likely be found and instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle. Moreover, until the
container itself was opened the police could never be certain that the contraband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle; thus
in every case in which a container was found, the vehicle would need to be
secured while a warrant was obtained. Such a requirement would be directly inconsistent with the decisions in Carroll and Chambers. Cf. nn. 19
and 22, supra.
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distinction between "worthy'' and "unworthy" containers
would be improper. 30 Even though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags,
locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were placed
on one side of the line or the other, 31 the central purpose of
the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction. For
just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic
mansion, 32 so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush
and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf
claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked
attache case.
As Justice Stewart stated in Robbins, the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of eve container
that concea s s con ens om pam VIew. - - U. S., at
- - (plurality opinion).But the protection afforded by the
Amendment varies in different settings. The luggage carried by a traveler entering the country may be searched at
Cf. - - U. S., at - - (plurality opinion); id., at - - (BLACKMUN, J.,
dissenting); id., at-- (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); id., a t - - (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
31
If the distinction is based on the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects only those containers that objectively manifest an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the propriety of a warrantless search necessarily would turn on much more than the fabric of the
contai~ A paper bag stapled shut and marked "private" might be found
__Jo mliiiifest a reasonable expectation of privacy, as might a cardboard box
~ stacked on top of two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the warrantless search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of all the
\•... surrounding circumstances.
32
" 'The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of
the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow
through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter-all his forces dares not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement!'" Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 307; cf.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 n. 54.
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random by a customs officer; the luggage may be searched no
matter how great the traveler's desire to conceal the contents
may be. A container carried at the time of arrest often may
be searched without a warrant; the owner's expectation of
privacy must yield if the police might be endangered or if evidence might be destroyed. A container that may conceal the
object of a search authorized by a warrant may be opened immediately; the individual's interest in privacy must give way
to the magistrate's official determination of probable cause.
In the same manner, an individual's expectation of privacy
in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause
is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband. Certainly the privacy interests in a car's trunk or
glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable
container; an individual undoubtedly has a significant interest
that the upholstery of his automobile will not be ripped or a
hidden compartment within it opened. These interests must
yield to the authority of a search, however, which-in light of
Carrollr-does not itself require the prior approval of a magistrate. The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower-and no broader-than the scope of
a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable
cause. Only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived;
the search otherwise is as the magistrate could authorize.
\
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is
not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to
believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will
not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a
suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed
in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband does not justify a
search of the entire cab.
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v
Our decision today is inconsistent with the disposition in
Robbins v. California and with s~Ar
kansas v. Sanders. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis~clude this action. Although we have rejected
some of the reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our holding in
that case; moreover, although we reject the precise holding
in Robbins, there was no Court opinion supporting a single
rationale for its judgment and the reasoning we adopt today
was not presented by the parties in that case. Furthermore,
we reaffirm the plurality's rejection of a constitutional distinction between worthy and unworthy containers. Moreover, it is clear that no legitimate reliance interest can be
frustrated by our decision today. Of greatest importance,
we are convinced that the rule we apply in this case is faithful
to the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that the
Court has followed with substantial consistency throughout
our history.
We reaffirm the basic rule of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence stated by Justice Stewart for a unanimous Court in
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390:
"The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable
searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (footnotes omitted)."
The exception recognized in Carroll is unquestionably one
that is "specifically established and well-delineated." We
hold that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by
that exception is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable
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cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-2209
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ALBERT ROSS, JR.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]
JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, the Court held
that a warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police
officers who had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court in Carroll did not explicitly address the scope of the search that is permissible.
In this case, we consider the extent to which police officerswho have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have
probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed somewhere within it-may conduct a probing search of compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are
not in plain view. We hold that they may conduct a search of
the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant "particularly describing the place to be
searched." 1
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In the evening of November 27, 1978, an informant who
had previously proved to be reliable telephoned Detective~,
'"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." U. S. Const., Arndt. 4.
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Marcum of the District of Columbia Police Department and
told him that an individual known as "Bandit" was selling
narcotics kept in the trunk of a car parked at 439 Ridge
Street. The informant stated that he had just observed
"Bandit" complete a sale and that "Bandit" had told him that
additional narcotics were in the trunk. The informant gave
Marcum a detailed description of "Bandit" and stated that the
car was a "purplish maroon" Chevrolet Malibu with District
of Columbia license plates.
Accompanied by Detective Cassidy and Sergeant Gonzales, Marcum immediately drove to the area and found a maroon Malibu parked in front of 439 Ridge Street. A license
check disclosed that the car was registered to Albert Ross; a
computer check on Ross revealed that he fit the informant's
description and used the alias "Bandit." In two passes
through the neighborhood the officers did not observe anyone
matching the informant's description. To avoid alerting persons on the street, they left the area.
The officers returned five minutes later and observed the
maroon Malibu turning off Ridge Street onto Fourth Street.
They pulled alongside the Malibu, noticed that the driver
matched the informant's description, and stopped the car.
Marcum and Cassidy told the driver-later identified as Albert Ross, the respondent in this action-to get out of the vehicle. While they searched Ross, Sergeant Gonzales discovered a bullet on the car's front seat. He searched the
interior of the car and found a pistol in the glove compartment. Ross then was arrested and handcuffed. Detective
Cassidy took Ross' keys and opened the trunk, where he
found a closed brown paper bag. He opened the bag and discovered a number of glassine bags containing a white powder. Cassidy replaced the bag, closed the trunk, and drove
the car to Headquarters.
At the police station Cassidy thoroughly searched the car.
In addition to the "lunch-type" brown paper bag, Cassidy
found in the trunk a zippered red leather pouch. He un-

J
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zipped the pouch and discovered $3,200 in cash. The police
laboratory later determined that the powder in the paper bag
was heroin. No warrant was obtained.
Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a). Prior to trial,
he moved to suppress the heroin found in the paper bag and
the currency found in the leather pouch. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion to suppress. The heroin and currency were introduced in evidence
at trial and Ross was convicted.
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction. It held that the police had probable cause to stop
and search Ross' car and that, under Carroll v. United
States, supra, and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, the
officers lawfully could search the automobile-including its
trunk-without a warrant. The court considered separately, however, the warrantless search of the two containers
found in the trunk. On the basis of Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U. S. 753, the court concluded that the constitutionality
of a warrantless search of a container found in an automobile
depends on whether the owner possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. Applying that test, the
court held that the warrantless search of the paper bag was
valid but the search of the leather pouch was not. The court
remanded for a new trial at which the items taken from the
paper bag, but not those from the leather pouch, could be
admitted. 2
The entire Court of Appeals then voted to rehear the case
en bane. A majority of the court rejected the panel's conclusion that a distinction of constitutional significance existed
between the two containers found in respondent's trunk; it
2
The court rejected the Government's argument that the warrantless
search of the leather pouch was justified as incident to respondent's arrest.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 137a. The Government has not challenged this
holding.
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held that the police should not have opened either container
without first obtaining a warrant. The court reasoned:
"No specific, well-delineated exception called to our
attention permits the police to dispense with a warrant
to open and search 'unworthy' containers. Moreover,
we believe that a rule under which the validity of a warrantless search would turn on judgments about the durability of a container would impose an unreasonable and
unmanageable burden on police and courts. For these
reasons, and because the Fourth Amendment protects
all persons, not just those with the resources or fastidiousness to place their effects in containers that decisionmakers would rank in the luggage line, we hold that the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement forbids the
warrantless opening of a closed, opaque paper bag to the
same extent that it forbids the warrantless opening of a
small unlocked suitcase or a zippered leather pouch."
655 F. 2d 1159, 1161 (CADC 1981) (footnote omitted).
The en bane Court of Appeals considered, and rejected, the
argument that it was reasonable for the police to open both
the paper bag and the leather pouch because they were entitled to conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle in
which the two containers were found. The majority concluded that this argument was foreclosed by Sanders.
Three dissenting judges interpreted Sanders differently. 3
Other courts also have read the Sanders opinion in different
3
Judge Tamm, the author of the original panel opinion, reiterated the
view that Sanders prohibited the warrantless search of the leather pouch
but not the search of the paper bag. Judge Robb agreed that this result
was compelled by Sanders, although he stated that in his opinion "the right
to search an automobile should include the right to open any container
found within the automobile, just as the right to search a lawfully arrested
prisoner carries with it the right to examine the contents of his wallet and
any envelope found in his pocket, and the right to search a room includes
authority to open and search all the drawers and containers found within
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ways. 4 Moreover, disagreement concerning the proper interpretation of Sanders was at least partially responsible for
the fact that Robbins v. California,-- U. S. --,was decided last Term without a Court opinion.
There is, however, no dispute among judges about the importance of striving for clarification in this area of the law.
For countless vehicles are stopped on highways and public
streets every day and our cases demonstrate that it is not uncommon for police officers to have probable cause to believe
that contraband may be found in a stopped vehicle. In every
such case a conflict is presented between the individual's constitutionally protected interest in privacy and the public interest in effective law enforcement. No single rule of law
can resolve every conflict, but our conviction that clarification is feasible led us to grant the Government's petition for
certiorari in this case and to invite the parties to address the
question whether the decision in Robbins should be reconsidered. - - U. S. - - .
II
We begin with a review of the decision in Carroll itself.
In the fall of 1921, federal prohibition agents obtained evidence that George Carroll and John Kiro were "bootleggers"
who frequently traveled between Grand Rapids and Detroit
the room." 655 F. 2d, at 1180. Judge MacKinnon concurred with Judge
Tamm that Sanders did not prohibit the warrantless search of the paper
bag. Concerning the leather pouch, he agreed with Judge Wilkey, who
dissented on the ground that Sanders should not be applied retroactively.
'Many courts have held that Sanders requires that a warrant be obtained only for personal luggage and other "luggage-type" containers.
See, e. g., United States v. Goshorn, 628 F. 2d 697 (CAl 1980); United
States v. Brown, 635 F. 2d 1207 (CA6 1980); United States v. Jiminez, 626
F . 2d 39 (CA71980). One court has held that Sanders does not apply if the
police have probable cause to search an entire vehicle and not merely an
isolated container within it. Cf. State v. Bible, 389 So. 2d 42 (La. 1980),
remanded,- U.S.-; State v. Hernandez, 408 So. 2d 911 (La. 1981);
see also United States v. Ross, 655 F . 2d, at 1180 (Robb, J., dissenting).
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in an Oldsmobile Roadster. 5 On December 15, 1921, the
agents unexpectedly encountered Carroll and Kiro driving
west on that route in that car. The officers gave pursuit,
stopped the roadster on the highway, and directed Carroll
and Kiro to get out of the car.
No contraband was visible in the front seat of the Oldsmobile and the rear portion of the roadster was closed. One of
the agents raised the rumble seat but found no liquor. He
raised the seat cushion and again found nothing. The officer
then struck at the "lazyback" of the seat and noticed that it
was "harder than upholstery ordinarily is in those backs."
267 U. S., at 174. He tore open the seat cushion and discovered 68 bottles of gin and whiskey concealed inside. No warrant had been obtained for the search.
Carroll and Kiro were convicted of transporting intoxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. On
review of those convictions, this Court ruled that the warrantless search of the roadster was reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In an extensive opinion
written by Chief Justice Taft, the Court held:
"On reason and authority the true rule is that if the
search and seizure without a warrant are made upon
probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be con5
On September 29, 1921, Carroll and Kiro met the agents in Grand Rapids and agreed to sell them three cases of whiskey. The sale was not consummated, however, possibly because Carroll learned the agents' true
identity. In October, the agents discovered Carroll and Kiro driving the
Oldsmobile Roadster on the road to Detroit, which was known as an active
center for the introduction of illegal liquor into this country. The agents
followed the roadster as far as East Lansing, but there abandoned the
chase.
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strued in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner
which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens." I d., at 149.
The Court explained at length the basis for this rule. The
Court noted that historically warrantless searches of vessels,
wagons, and carriages-as opposed to fixed premises such as
a home or other building-had been considered reasonable by
Congress. Mter reviewing legislation enacted by Congress
between 1789 and 1799, 6 the Court stated:
"Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment we find in the first Congress, and in
the following Second and Fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a
dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course
of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel
where they readily could be put out of reach of a search
warrant." ld., at 151.
The Court reviewed additional legislation passed by Congress 7 and again noted that
"the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Govern' The legislation authorized customs officials to search any ship or vessel
without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that it concealed
goods subject to duty. The same legislation required a warrant for
searches of dwelling places. 267 U. S. , at 150--151.
7
In particular, the Court noted an 1815 statute that permitted customs
officers not only to board and search vessels without a warrant "but also to
stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom
they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty or
had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to
law." Id., at 151.
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ment, as recognizing a necessary difference between a
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be
obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought." I d., at 153.
Thus, since its earliest days Congress had recognized the
impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the
transportation of contraband goods. 8 It is this impracticability, viewed in historical perspective, that provided the
basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an automobile in transit, the Court recognized that an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit
substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable. 9
8
In light of this established history, individuals always had been on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise
to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those facts.
9
Subsequent cases make clear that the decision in Carroll was not based
on the fact that the only course available to the police was an immediate
search. As Justice Harlan later recognized, although a failure to seize a
moving automobile believed to contain contraband might deprive officers of
the illicit goods, once a vehicle itself has been stopped the exigency does
not necessarily justify a warrantless search. Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U. S. 42, 62-64 (opinion of Harlan, J.). The Court in Chambers, however-with only Justice Harlan dissenting-refused to adopt a rule that
would permit a warrantless seizure but prohibit a warrantless search.
The Court held that if police officers have probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct an
immediate search of the contents of that vehicle. "For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a
car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
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In defining the nature of this "exception" to the general
rule that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used," id., at 156, the Court in
Carroll emphasized the importance of the requirement that
officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.
"Having thus established that contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other
vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come
now to consider under what circumstances such search
may be made. It would be intolerable and unreasonable
if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travellers may
be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to
Amendment." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S., at 52.
The Court also has held that if an immediate search on the street is permissible without a warrant, a search soon thereafter at the police station is
permissible if the vehicle is impounded. Chambers, supra; Texas v.
White, 423 U. S. 67. These decisions are based on the practicalities of the
situations presented and a realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a contrary rule would provide for privacy interests. Given the
scope of the initial intrusion caused by a seizure of an automobile-which
often could leave the occupants stranded on the highway-the Court rejected an inflexible rule that would force police officers in every case either
to post guard at the vehicle while a warrant is obtained or to tow the vehicle itself to the station. Similarly, if an immediate search on the scene
could be conducted, but not one at the station if the vehicle is impounded,
police often simply would search the vehicle on the street-at no advantage
to the occupants, yet possibly at certain cost to the police. The rules as
applied in particular cases may appear unsatisfactory. They reflect, however, a reasoned application of the more general rule that if an individual
gives the police probable cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contraband, he loses the right to proceed on his way without official interference.
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come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country,
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free
passage without interruption or search unless there is
known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying
contraband or illegal merchandise." !d., at 153--154.
Moreover, the probable cause determination must be based
on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant
by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith
of the police officers. "'[A]s we have seen, good faith is not
enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be
grounded on facts within knowledge of the [officer], which in
the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable.'"
!d., at 161-162 (quoting Director General v. Kastenbaum,
263

u. s. 25, 28).

10

The Court in Carroll also emphasized that the vehicle had
been stopped "in the course of transportation." 267 U. S.,
at 149. Nothing in the opinion in that case suggests that an
automobile parked in a private driveway could be searched
without a warrant, absent other circumstances justifying a
warrantless search. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U. S. 443. 11 In short, the exception to the warrant requirement established in Carroll-the scope of which we consider
in this case-applies only to vehicles ~topped ~ the public
10

After reviewing the relevant authorities at some length, the Court concluded that the probable cause requirement was satisfied in the case before
it. The Court held that "the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which
they stopped and searched." !d., at 162. Cf. Brinegar v. United States,
338 U. S. 160, 17~177; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102.
"At page 6 of their brief amicus curiae, the Americans for Effective
Law Enforcement and the International Association of Chiefs of Police also
state that it is clear that the Carroll exception does not extend to a house
trailer or camper used for residential purposes.

l
1
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highways and to searches that are supported by probable ~
cause. 12 In this class of cases, a search is not unreasonable if
based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant,
even though a warrant has not actually been obtained. 13

III
The rationale justifying a warrantless search of an automobile that is believed to be transporting contraband arguably
applies with equal force to any movable container that is believed to be carrying an illicit substance. That argument,
however, was squarely rejected in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1.
Chadwick involved the warrantless search of a 200-pound
footlocker. Federal railroad officials in San Diego became
suspicious when they noticed that a brown footlocker loaded
12
See Husky v. United States, 282 U. S. 694; Scher v. United States, 305
U. S. 251; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160; Henry v. United
States, 361 U. S. 98; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U. S. 216; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42; Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67; Colorado v.
Bannister, 449 U. S. 1.
Warrantless searches of automobiles have been upheld in a variety of
factual contexts quite different from that presented in Carroll. Cf.
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433;
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364. Many of these searches do not
require a showing of probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband.
We are not called upon-and do not-consider in this case the scope of the
warrantless search that is permitted in those cases.
13
As the Court in Carroll concluded:
"We here find the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizures of
liquor in transport in vehicles. It is certainly a reasonable distinction. It
gives the owner of an automobile or other vehicle seized under Section 26,
in absence of probable cause, a right to have restored to him the automobile, it protects him under the Weeks and Amos cases from use of the liquor
as evidence against him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to
damages. On the other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the Government and its officials are given the opportunity which they should have,
to make the investigation necessary to trace reasonably suspected contraband goods and to seize them." 267 U. S., at 156.
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onto a train bound for Boston was unusually heavy and leaking talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor
of marijuana. Narcotics agents met the train in Boston and
a trained police dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance inside the footlocker. While the agents awaited further developments, respondent Chadwick arrived and the
footlocker was placed in the trunk of Chadwick's automobile.
At that point, while the trunk of the car was still open and
before the engine had been started, the agents seized the
footlocker. They later searched the footlocker without a
warrant and discovered a large quantity of marijuana.
In a subsequent criminal proceeding, Chadwick claimed
that the warrantless search of the footlocker violated the
Fourth Amendment. In the District Court, the Government
argued that as soon as the footlocker was placed in the automobile a warrantless search was permissible under Carroll.
The District Court rejected that argument, 14 and the Government did not pursue it on appeal. 15 Rather, the Government
contended in this Court that the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment applied only to searches of homes and
other "core" areas of privacy. The Court unanimously rejected that contention. 16 Writing for the Court, THE CHIEF
JUSTICE stated:
"The District Court noted:
"In this case, there was no nexus between the search and the automobile,
merely a coincidence. The challenged search in this case was one of a footlocker, not an automobile. The search took place not in an automobile, but
in [the federal building]. The only connection that the automobile had to
this search was that, prior to its seizure, the footlocker was placed on the
floor of an automobile's open trunk." United States v. Chadwick, 393 F.
Supp. 763, 772 (Mass. 1975).
15
This Court specifically noted: "The Government does not contend that
the footlocker's brief contact with Chadwick's car makes this an automobile
search, but it is argued that the rationale of our automobile search cases
demonstrates the reasonableness of permitting warrantless searches of
luggage; the Government views such luggage as analagous to motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes." 433 U. S., at 11-12.
'"See id., at 17 (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting).
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"[I]f there is little evidence that the Framers intended
the Warrant Clause to operate outside the home, there is
no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from protection of the Clause all searches occurring outside the
home. The absence of a contemporary outcry against
warrantless searches in public places was because, aside
from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless
searches were not a large issue in colonial America.
Thus, silence in the historical record tells us little about
the Framers' attitude toward application of the Warrant
Clause to the search of respondents' footlocker. What
we do know is that the Framers were men who focused
on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth
Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which
would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it
birth." 433 U. 8., at 8-9 (footnote omitted).
The Court in Chadwick specifically rejected the argument
that the warrantless search was "reasonable" because a footlocker has some of the mobile characteristics that support
warrantless searches of automobiles. The Court recognized
that "a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage
are substantially greater than in an automobile," id., at 13,
and noted that the practical problems associated with the
temporary detention of a piece of luggage during the period
of time necessary to obtain a warrant are significantly less
than those associated with the detention of an automobile.
!d., at 13, n. 7. In ruling that the warrantless search of the
footlocker was unjustified, the Court reaffirmed the general
principle that closed packages and containers may not be
searched without a warrant. Cf. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S.
727; United States v. Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249. In sum, the
Court in Chadwick declined to extend the rationale of the
"automobile exception" to permit a warrantless search of any
movable container found in a public place. 17
17

The Court concluded that there is a significant difference between the
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The facts in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, were similar to those in Chadwick. In Sanders, a Little Rock police
officer received information from a reliable informant that
Sanders would arrive at the local airport on a specified flight
that afternoon carrying a green suitcase containing marijuana. The officer went to the airport. Sanders arrived on
schedule and retrieved a green suitcase from the airline baggage service. Sanders gave the suitcase to a waiting companion who placed it in the trunk of a taxi. Sanders and his
companion drove off in the cab; police officers followed and
stopped the taxi several blocks from the airport. The officers opened the trunk, seized the suitcase, and searched it on
the scene without a warrant. As predicted, the suitcase contained marijuana.
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless
search of the suitcase was impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment, and this Court affirmed. As in Chadwick, the
mere fact that the suitcase had been placed in the trunk of
the vehicle did not render the automobile exception of Carroll applicable; the police had probable cause to seize the suitcase before it was placed in the trunk of the cab and did not
have probable cause to search the taxi itself. 18 Since the
seizure of a sealed package and a subsequent search of its contents; the
search of the container in that case was "a far greater intrusion into Fourth
Amendment values than the impoundment of the footlocker." Id., at 13,
n. 8. A temporary seizure of a package or piece of luggage often may be
accomplished without as significant an intrusion upon the individual-and
without as great a burden on the police-as in the case of the seizure of an
automobile. Seen. 9, supra.
'" The Arkansas Supreme Court carefully reviewed the facts of the case
and concluded: "The information supplied to the police by the confidential
informant is adequate to support the State's claim that the police had probable cause to believe that appellant's green suitcase contained a controlled
substance when the police confiscated the suitcase and opened it." 262
Ark. 595, 599, 559 S.W. 2d 704, 706 (1977). The court also noted: "The
evidence in this case supports the conclusion that the relationship between
the suitcase and the taxicab is coincidental." Id., at 600, n. 2, 559 S.W.
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suitcase had been placed in the trunk, no danger existed that
its contents could have been secreted elsewhere in the vehicle. 19 As THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted in his opinion concurring
in the judgment:
"Because the police officers had probable cause to believe that respondent's green suitcase contained marijuana before it was placed in the trunk of the taxicab,
their duty to obtain a search warrant before opening it is
clear under United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1
(1977).

*

*

*

Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage being transported by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the
automobile in which it was being carried, that was the
suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship between the automobile and the contraband was purely coincidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase
was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time of
respondent's arrest does not turn this into an 'automobile' exception case. The Court need say no more."
ld., at 76&-767.
The Court in Sanders did not, however, rest its decision
solely on the authority of Chadwick. In rejecting the State's
argument that the warrantless search of the suitcase was justified on the ground that it had been taken from an automobile lawfully stopped on the street, the Court broadly suggested that a warrantless search of a container found in an
automobile could never be sustained as part of a warrantless
search of the automobile itself. 20 The Court did not suggest
2d, at 706.
19
Moreover, none of the practical difficulties associated with the detention of a vehicle on a public highway that made the immediate search in
Carroll reasonable could justify an immediate search of the suitcase, since
the officers had no interest in detaining the taxi or its driver.
The Court stated that "the extent to which the Fourth Amendment ap21)
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that it mattered whether probable cause existed to search
the entire vehicle. It is clear, however, that in neither
Chadwick nor Sanders did the police have probable cause to
search the vehicle or anything within it except the footlocker
in the former case and the green suitcase in the latter.
Robbins v. California, --U.S. - - , however, was a
case in which suspicion was not directed at a specific container. In that case the Court for the first time was forced
to consider whether police officers who are entitled to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile stopped on a public roadway may open a container found within the vehicle.
In the early morning of January 5, 1975, police officers
stopped Robbins' station wagon because he was driving erratically. Robbins got out of the car, but later returned to
obtain the vehicle's registration papers. When he opened
the car door, the officers smelled marijuana smoke. One of
the officers searched Robbins and discovered a vial of liquid;
in a search of the interior of the car the officer found marijuana. The police officers then opened the tailgate of the
station wagon and raised the cover of a recessed luggage
compartment. In the compartment they found two packages
wrapped in green opaque plastic. The police unwrapped the
packages and discovered a large amount of marijuana in each.
Robbins was charged with various drug offenses and
moved to suppress the contents of the plastic packages.
The California Court of Appeal held that "[s]earch of the
plies to containers and other parcels depends not at all upon whether they
are seized from an automobile." 442 U. S. , at 764, n. 13. This general
rule was limited only by the observation that "[n]ot all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a
kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred
from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a
package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the need for a warrant." Ibid.
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automobile was proper when the officers learned that appellant was smoking marijuana when they stopped him" 21 and
that the warrantless search of the packages was justified because "the contents of the packages could have been inferred
from their outward appearance, so that appellant could not
have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
the contents." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780,
783 (1980).
This Court reversed. Writing for a plurality, Justice
Stewart rejected the argument that the outward appearance
of the packages precluded Robbins from having a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their contents. He also squarely
rejected the argument that there is a constitutional distinction between searches of luggage and searches of "less worthy" containers. Justice Stewart reasoned that all containers are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment unless
their contents are in plain view. The plurality concluded
that the warrantless search was impermissible because
Chadwick and Sanders had established that "a closed piece of
luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally
protected to the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage
found anywhere else." - - U. S., at--.
In a concurring opinion, JUSTICE POWELL, the author of
the Court's opinion in Sanders, stated that "[t]he plurality's
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes
substantial burdens on law enforcement without vindicating
any significant values of privacy." I d., at - - . 22 He noted
2

103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 39, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782 (1980).
"While the plurality's blanket warrant requirement does not even purport to protect any privacy interest, it would impose substantial new burdens on law enforcement. Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in
the course of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the
conscientious policeman would be required to take the object to a magistrate, fill out the appropriate forms, await the decision, and finally obtain a
warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while the warrant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer from his
'
22
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that possibly "the controlling question should be the scope of
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement," id., at
- - , and explained that under that view
"when the police have probable cause to search an automobile, rather than only to search a particular container
that fortuitously is located in it, the exigencies that allow
the police to search the entire automobile without a warrant support the warrantless search of every container
found therein. See post, at - - and n. 13 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with
the holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which
is an 'automobile case,' because the police there had
probable cause to search the double-locked footlocker
and the suitcase respectively before either came near an
automobile." Ibid.
The parties in Robbins had not pressed that argument, however, and JUSTICE POWELL concluded that institutional constraints made it inappropriate to re-examine basic doctrine
without full adversary presentation. He concurred in the
judgment, since it was supported-although not compelledby the Court's opinion in Sanders, and stated that a future
case might present a better opportunity for thorough consideration of the basic principles in this troubled area.
normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn from
the public's limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes, is justified when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests. In my
view, the plurality's requirement cannot be so justified. The aggregate
burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable cause to
search the most trivial container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the advancement of important Fourth Amendment values." - U. S., at-- (POWELL, J., concurring).
The substantial burdens on law enforcement identified by JUSTICE PowELL would, of course, not be affected by the character of the container
found during an automobile search. No comparable practical problems
arise when the official suspicion is confined to a particular piece of luggage,
as in Chadwick and Sanders. Cf. n. 19, supra.

80-2209-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. ROSS

19

That case has arrived. Unlike Chadwick and Sanders, in
this case police officers had probable cause to search respondent's entire vehicle. 23 Unlike Robbins, in this case the parties have squarely addressed the question whether, in the
course of a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile,
police are entitled to open containers found within the vehicle. We now address that question. Its answer is determined by the scope of the search that is authorized by the exception to the warrant requirement set forth in Carroll.
IV
In Carroll itself, the whiskey that the prohibition agents
seized was not in plain view. It was discovered only after an
officer opened the rumble seat and tore open the upholstery
of the lazyback. The Court did not find the scope of the
search unreasonable. Having stopped Carroll and Kiro on a
public road and subjected them to the indignity of a vehicle
search-which the Court found to be a reasonable intrusion
on their privacy because it was based on probable cause that
their vehicle was transporting contraband-prohibition
agents were entitled to tear open a portion of the roadster
itself. The scope of the search was no greater than a magistrate could have authorized by issuing a warrant based on the
The en bane Court of Appeals stated that "[b ]ased on the tip the police
received, Ross's car was properly stopped and searched, and the pouch and
bag were properly seized." 655 F. 2d, at 1168 (footnote omitted). The
court explained:
"[W]e believe it clear that the police had ample and reasonable cause to
stop Ross and to search his car. The informer had supplied accurate information on prior occasions, and he was an eyewitness to sales of narcotics
by Ross. He said he had just seen Ross take narcotics from the trunk of
his car in making a sale and heard him say he possessed additional narcotics." /d., at 1168, n. 22.
The court further noted that "[i]n this case, the informant told the police
that Ross had narcotics in the trunk of his car. No specific container was
identified." /d., at 1166.
23
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probable cause that justified the search. Since such a warrant could have authorized the agents to open the rear portion of the roadster and to rip the upholstery in their search
for concealed whiskey, the search was constitutionally
permissible.
In Chambers v. Maroney the police found weapons and
stolen property "concealed in a compartment under the dashboard." 399 U. S., at 44. No suggestion was made that the
scope of the search was impermissible. It would be illogical
to assume that the outcome of Chambers-or the outcome of
Carroll itself-would have been different if the police had
found the secreted contraband enclosed within a secondary
container and had opened that container without a warrant.
If it was reasonable for prohibition agents to rip open the upholstery in Carroll, it certainly would have been reasonable
for them to look into a burlap sack stashed inside; if it was
reasonable to open the concealed compartment in Chambers,
it would have been equally reasonable to open a paper bag
crumpled within it. A contrary rule could produce absurd
results inconsistent with the decision in Carroll itself.
In its application of Carroll, this Court in fact has sustained warrantless searches of containers found during a lawful search of an automobile. In Rusty v. United States, 282
U. S. 694, the Court upheld a warrantless seizure of whiskey
found during a search of an automobile, some of which was
discovered in "whiskey bags" that could have contained other
goods. 24 In Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251, federal officers seized and searched packages of unstamped liquor
found in the trunk of an automobile searched without a warrant. As described by a police officer who participated in
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked the police officer
who had conducted the search: "Isn't it possible to put other goods in a bag
that has the resemblance of a whiskey bag?" The officer responded: "I
suppose it is. I did not think of that at that time. I knew it was whiskey,
I was sure it was." App., O.T. 1930, No. 477, p. 27.
24
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the search: "I turned the handle and opened the trunk and
found the trunk completely filled with packages wrapped in
brown paper, and tied with twine; I think somewhere around
thirty packages, each one containing six bottles." 25 In these
cases it was not contended that police officers needed a warrant to open the whiskey bags or to unwrap the brown paper
packages. The fact that no such argument was even made
illuminates the profession's understanding of the scope of the
search permitted under Carroll. Indeed, prior to the decisions in Chadwick and Sanders, courts routinely had held
that containers and packages found during a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile also could be searched without a warrant. 26
As we have stated, the decision in Carroll was based on
the Court's appraisal of practical· considerations viewed in the
perspective of history. It is therefore significant that the
practical consequences of the Carroll decision would be
largely nullified if the permissible scope of a warrantless
25

App., O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 33. The brief of then Solicitor General
Robert Jackson noted that the items searched "were wrapped in very
heavy brown wrapping paper with at least two wrappings and with a heavy
cord around them cross-wise so that they could readily be lifted." Brief
for United States, O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 6.
2
"See, e. g., United States v. Soriano, 497 F. 2d 147, 149-150 (CA51974)
(en bane); United States v. Vento, 533 F. 2d 838, 867, n. 101 (CA3 1976);
United States v. Tramunti, 513 F. 2d 1087, 1104 (CA2 1975); United States
v. Issod, 508 F. 2d 990, 993 (CA71974); United States v. Evans, 481 F. 2d
990, 994 (CA9 1973); United States v. Bowman, 487 F. 2d 1229 (CAlO
1973). Many courts continued to apply this rule following the decision in
Chadwick. Cf. United States v. Milhollan, 599 F. 2d 518, 526-527 (CA3
1979); United States v. Gaultney, 581 F. 2d 1137, 1144-1145 (CA5 1978);
United States v. Finnegan, 568 F. 2d 637, 640-641 (CA9 1977). In ruling
that police could search luggage and other containers found during a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile, courts often assumed that the
"automobile exception" of Carroll applied whenever a container in an automobile was believed to contain contraband. That view, of course, has
since been qualified by Chadwick and Sanders.

\
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search of an automobile did not include containers and packages found inside the vehicle. Contraband goods rarely are
strewn across the trunk or floor of a car; since by their very
nature such goods must be withheld from public view, they
rarely can be placed in an automobile unless they are enclosed within some form of container. 27 The Court in Carroll \
held that "contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for
without a warrant." 267 U. S., at 153 (emphasis added).
As we noted in Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 104, the
decision in Carroll "merely relaxed the requirements for a
warrant on grounds of impracticability." It neither broadened nor limited the scope of a lawful search based on probable cause.
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the
entire area in which the object of the search may be found
and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. 28
27

It is noteworthy that the early legislation on which the Court relied in
Carroll concerned the enforcement of laws imposing duties on imported
merchandise. See nn. 6 and 7, supra. Presumably such merchandise was
shipped then in containers of various kinds, just as it is today. Since Congress had authorized warrantless searches of vessels and beasts for imported merchandise, it is inconceivable that it intended a customs officer to
obtain a warrant for every package discovered during the search; certainly
Congress intended customs officers to open shipping containers when necessary and not merely to examine the exterior of cartons or boxes in which
smuggled goods might be concealed. During virtually the entire history of
our country-whether contraband was transported in a horse drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern automobile-it has been assumed that a
lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of any container that
might conceal the object of the search.
:?S In describing the permissible scope of a search of a home pursuant to a
warrant, Professor LaFave notes:
"Places within the described premises are not excluded merely because
some additional act of entry or opening may be required. 'In countless
cases in which warrants described only the land and the buildings, a search
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Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home
for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets,
chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might
be found. A warrant to open a footlocker to search for marijuana would also authorize the opening of packages found inside. A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search
of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object of
the search. When a legitimate search is under way, and
when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined,
nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in
the case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand. 29
This rule applies equally to all containers, as indeed we believe it must. One point on which the Court was in virtually
unanimous agreement in Robbins was that a constitutional
distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers
would be improper. 30 Even though such a distinction perof desks, cabinets, closets and similar items has been permitted.'" 2
LaFave, Search and Seizure 152 (1978) (quoting Massey v. Commonwealth, 305 S. W. 2d 755, 756 (Ky. 1957)).
29
The practical considerations that justify a warrantless search of an
automobile continue to apply until the entire search of the automobile and
its contents has been completed. Arguably, the entire vehicle itself could
be searched without a warrant, with all containers found during that
search then taken to a magistrate. Certainly no privacy interest is
served, however, by prohibiting police from opening immediately a container in which the object of the search may most likely be found and instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle. Moreover, until the
container itself was opened the police could never be certain that the contraband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle; thus
in every case in which a container was found, the vehicle would need to be
secured while a warrant was obtained. Such a requirement would be directly inconsistent with the decisions in Carroll and Chambers. Cf. nn. 19
and 22, supra.
30
Cf. - - U. S., at-- (plurality opinion); id., at-- (BLACKMUN, J. ,

'

\

80-2209-0PINION
24

UNITED STATES v. ROSS

haps could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags,
locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were placed
on one side of the line or the other, 31 the central purpose of
the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction. For
just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic
mansion, 32 so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush
and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf
claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked
attache case.
As Justice Stewart stated in Robbins, the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container
that conceals its contents from plain view. - - U. S., at
- - (plurality opinion). But the protection afforded by the
Amendment varies in different settings. The luggage carried by a traveler entering the country may be searched at
random by a customs officer; the luggage may be searched no
dissenting); id., at-- (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); id., at-- (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
31
If the distinction is based on the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects only those containers that objectively manifest an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the propriety of a warrantless search necessarily would turn on much more than the fabric of the
container. A paper bag stapled shut and marked "private" might be found
to manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy, as could a cardboard box
stacked on top of two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the warrantless search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of all the
surrounding circumstances.
32
" 'The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of
the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow
through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter-all his forces dares not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement!'" Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 307 (quoting
remarks attributed to William Pitt); cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S.
573, 601 n. 54.
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matter how great the traveler's desire to conceal the contents
may be. A container carried at the time of arrest often may
be searched without a warrant and even without any specific \
suspicion concerning its contents. A container that may conceal the object of a search authorized by a warrant may be
opened immediately; the individual's interest in privacy must
give way to the magistrate's official determination of probable cause.
In the same manner, an individual's expectation of privacy
in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause
is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband. Certainly the privacy interests in a car's trunk or
glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable
container. An individual undoubtedly has a significant interest that the upholstery of his automobile will not be ripped or
a hidden compartment within it opened. These interests
must yield to the authority of a search, however, which-in
light of Carroll-does not itself require the prior approval of
a magistrate. The scope of a warrantless search based on
probable cause is no narrower-and no broader-than the
scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause. Only the prior approval of the magistrate is
waived; the search otherwise is as the magistrate could
authorize.
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is
not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to
believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will
not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a
suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed

-
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in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does
not justify a search of the entire cab.

t ,(}l

v

\.

Our decision today is inconsistent with the disposition in
Robbins v. California and with some of the reasoning in Arkansas v. Sanders. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this action. Although we have rejected
some of the reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our holding in
that case; although we reject the precise holding in Robbins,
there was no Court opinion supporting a single rationale for
its judgment and the reasoning we adopt today was not presented by the parties in that case. ~oreover, it is clear that
no legitimate reliance interest can be frustrated by our decision today. 33 Of greatest importance, we are convinced that
the rule we apply in this case is faithful to the interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment that the Court has followed with
substantial consistency throughout our history.
We reaffirm the basic rule of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence stated by Justice Stewart for a unanimous Court in
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390:
"The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable
searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (footnotes omitted).''
The exception recognized in Carroll is unquestionably one
that is "specifically established and well-delineated." We
33

Any interest in maintaining the status quo that might be asserted by \
persons who may have structured their business of distributing narcotics
or other illicit substances on the basis of judicial precedents clearly would
not be legitimate.
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hold that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by
that exception is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The \
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion . .

It is so ordered.

May 10, 1982

80-2209 United States v. Ross

DeC\r ,John:
In effect, my vote at Conference was to "join
five" to give a strong Court for a uniform rule in an area
where law enforcement and courts need clear quidance.
I think you have written an excP.Jlent ooinion.
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The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is
not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to
believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will
not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a
silltcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed
in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does
~
not justify a search of the entire cab.
"'In choosing to search without a warrant o
probable cause, police officers of course lose the rotection that a warrant
would provide to them in an action for damages rought by an individual
claiming that the search was unconstitutional. Cf. Bivens v. Six Un- _
known Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388.fA-w~!ssue )'-a
magistrate...will·generaliy-esta bliSht:hat"'>ffi~-ac~ed-iJrgood-faith-1n conducting the-sear.eh. Cf. Carroll, supra, at 156 ("In cases where seizure is
/impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and
~~t hi' peril unle>' he oan 'how the oowt p'Obable oause.'?.
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Although an officer may establish that he acted in good
faith in conducting the search by other evidence, a warrant
issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish it.

'·.

,.

authoriZe.""
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is
not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to
believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will
not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a
suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed
in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does
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not justify a search of the entire cab.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 8{}-2209

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
ALBERT ROSS, JR.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
In my opinion in Robbins v. California,-- U.S. - (1981), concurring in the judgment, I stated that the judgment was justified, though not compelled, by the Court's
opinion in Arkansas v. Sander, 442 U. S. 756 (1979). I did
not agree, however, with the "bright line" rule articulated by
the plurality opinion. Rather, I repeated the view I long
have held that one's "reasonable expectation of privacy" is a
particularly relevant factor in determining the validity of a
warrantless search. I have recognized, that with respect to
automobiles in general, this expectation can be only a limited
one. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at 761; AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 279 (POWELL, J.,
concurring). I continue to think that in many situations
one's reasonable expectation of privacy may be a decisive factor in a search case.
It became evident last Term, however, from the five opinions written in Robbins-in none of which THE CHIEF JusTICE joined-that it is essential to have a Court opinion in
automobile search cases that provides "specific guidance to
police and courts in this reoccuring situation". Robbins v.
California,-- U. S. - - (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring).
The Court's opinion today, written by JUSTICE STEVENS and
now joined by four other Justices, will afford this needed
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guidance. It is fair also to say that, given Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132 (19-) and Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U. S. 42 (19-), the Court's decision does not depart
substantially from Fourth Amendment doctrine in automobile cases. Moreover, in enunciating a readily understood
and applied rule, today's decision is consistent with the similar step taken last Term in Belton v. New York, - - U. S.
(1981).
I join the Court's opinion.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Stevens

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __
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5th DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-2209
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
ALBERT ROSS, JR.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, the Court held
that a warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police
officers who had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court in Carroll did not explicitly address the scope of the search that is permissible.
In this case, we consider the extent to which police officerswho have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have
probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed somewhere within it-may conduct a probing search of compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are
not in plain view. We hold that they may conduct a search of
the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant "particularly describing the place to be
searched." 1
I
In the evening of November 27, 1978, an informant who
1

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affinnation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
/ / "Lh d _
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const., Arndt. 4.
~-( _,)C.._7

"~S ~ ~ ~ ~t .3'2
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r~'r ·
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had previously proved to be reliable telephoned Detective
Marcum of the District of Columbia Police Department and
told him that an individual known as "Bandit" was selling
narcotics kept in the trunk of a car parked at 439 Ridge
Street. The informant stated that he had just observed
"Bandit" complete a sale and that "Bandit" had told him that
additional narcotics were in the trunk. The informant gave
Marcum a detailed description of "Bandit" and stated that the
car was a "purplish maroon" Chevrolet Malibu with District
of Columbia license plates.
Accompanied by Detective Cassidy and Sergeant Gonzales, Marcum immediately drove to the area and found a maroon Malibu parked in front of 439 Ridge Street. A license
check disclosed that the car was registered to Albert Ross; a
computer check on Ross revealed that he fit the informant's
description and used the alias "Bandit." In two passes
through the neighborhood the officers did not observe anyone
matching the informant's description. To avoid alerting persons on the street, they left the area.
The officers returned five minutes later and observed the
maroon Malibu turning off Ridge Street onto Fourth Street.
They pulled alongside the Malibu, noticed that the driver
matched the informant's description, and stopped the car.
Marcum and Cassidy told the driver-later identified as Albert Ross, the respondent in this action-to get out of the vehicle. While they searched Ross, Sergeant Gonzales discovered a bullet on the car's front seat. He searched the
interior of the car and found a pistol in the glove compartment. Ross then was arrested and handcuffed. Detective
Cassidy took Ross' keys and opened the trunk, where he
found a closed brown paper bag. He opened the bag and discovered a number of glassine bags containing a white powder. Cassidy replaced the bag, closed the trunk, and drove
the car to Headquarters.
At the police station Cassidy thoroughly searched the car.
In addition to the "lunch-type" brown paper bag, Cassidy
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found in the trunk a zippered red leather pouch. He unzipped the pouch and discovered $3,200 in cash. The police
laboratory later determined that the powder in the paper bag
was heroin. No warrant was obtained.
Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a). Prior to trial,
he moved to suppress the heroin found in the paper bag and
the currency found in the leather pouch. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion to suppress. The heroin and currency were introduced in evidence
at trial and Ross was convicted.
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction. It held that the police had probable cause to stop
and search Ross' car and that, under Carroll v. United
States, supra, and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, the
officers lawfully could search the automobile-including its
trunk-without a warrant. The court considered separately, however, the warrantless search of the two containers
found in the trunk. On the basis of Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U. S. 753, the court concluded that the constitutionality
of a warrantless search of a container found in an automobile
depends on whether the owner possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. Applying that test, the
court held that the warrantless search of the paper bag was
valid but the search of the leather pouch was not. The court
remanded for a new trial at which the items taken from the
paper bag, but not those from the leather pouch, could be
admitted. 2
The entire Court of Appeals then voted to rehear the case
en bane. A majority of the court rejected the panel's conclusion that a distinction of constitutional significance existed
2
The court rejected the Government's argument that the warrantless
search of the leather pouch was justified as incident to respondent's arrest.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 137a. The Government has not challenged this
holding.
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between the two containers found in respondent's trunk; it
held that the police should not have opened either container
without first obtaining a warrant. The court reasoned:
"No specific, well-delineated exception called to our
attention permits the police to dispense with a warrant
to open and search 'unworthy' containers. Moreover,
we believe that a rule under which the validity of a warrantless search would turn on judgments about the durability of a container would impose an unreasonable and
unmanageable burden on police and courts. For these
reasons, and because the Fourth Amendment protects
all persons, not just those with the resources or fastidiousness to place their effects in containers that decisionmakers would rank in the luggage line, we hold that the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement forbids the
warrantless opening of a closed, opaque paper bag to the
same ·extent that it forbids the warrantless opening of a
small unlocked suitcase or a zippered leather pouch."
655 F. 2d 1159, 1161 (CADC 1981) (footnote omitted).
The en bane Court of Appeals considered, and rejected, the
argument that it was reasonable for the police to open both
the paper bag and the leather pouch because they were entitled to conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle in
which the two containers were found. The majority concluded that this argument was foreclosed by Sanders.
Three dissenting judges interpreted Sanders differently. 3
Other courts also have read the Sanders opinion in different
3
Judge Tamm, the author of the original panel opinion, reiterated the
view that Sanders prohibited the warrantless search of the leather pouch
but not the search of the paper bag. Judge Robb agreed that this result
was compelled by Sanders, although he stated that in his opinion "the right
to search an automobile should include the right to open any container
found within the automobile, just as the right to search a lawfully arrested
prisoner carries with it the right to examine the contents of his wallet and
any envelope found in his pocket, and the right to search a room includes
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ways. 4 Moreover, disagreement concerning the proper interpretation of Sanders was at least partially responsible for
the fact that Robbins v. California,-- U. S. --,was decided last Term without a Court opinion.
There is, however, no dispute among judges about the importance of striving for clarification in this area of the law.
For countless vehicles are stopped on highways and public
streets every day and our cases demonstrate that it is not uncommon for police officers to have probable cause to believe
that contraband may be found in a stopped vehicle. In every
such case a conflict is presented between the individual's constitutionally protected interest in privacy and the public interest in effective law enforcement. No single rule of law
can resolve every conflict, but our conviction that clarification is feasible led us to grant the Government's petition for
certiorari in this case and to invite the parties to address the
question whether the decision in Robbins should be reconsidered. - - U. S. - - .
II
We begin with a review of the decision in Carroll itself.
In the fall of 1921, federal prohibition agents obtained evidence that George Carroll and John Kiro were "bootleggers"
authority to open and search all the drawers and containers found within
the room." 655 F. 2d, at 1180. Judge MacKinnon concurred with Judge
Tamm that Sanders did not prohibit the warrantless search of the paper
bag. Concerning the leather pouch, he agreed with Judge Wilkey, who
dissented on the ground that Sanders should not be applied retroactively.
' Many courts have held that Sanders requires that a warrant be obtained only for personal luggage and other "luggage-type" containers.
See, e. g., United States v. Goshorn, 628 F. 2d 697 (CAl 1980); United
States v. Brown, 635 F. 2d 1207 (CA6 1980); United States v. Jiminez, 626
F. 2d 39 (CA71980). One court has held that Sanders does not apply if the
police have probable cause to search an entire vehicle and not merely an
isolated container within it. Cf. State v. Bible, 389 So. 2d 42 (La. 1980),
remanded, 453 U. S. 918; State v. Hernandez, 408 So. 2d 911 (La. 1981);
see also United States v. Ross, 655 F. 2d, at 1180 (Robb, J., dissenting).
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who frequently traveled between Grand Rapids and Detroit
in an Oldsmobile Roadster. 5 On December 15, 1921, the
agents unexpectedly encountered Carroll and Kiro driving
west on that route in that car. The officers gave pursuit,
stopped the roadster on the highway, and directed Carroll
and Kiro to get out of the car.
No contraband was visible in the front seat of the Oldsmobile and the rear portion of the roadster was closed. One of
the agents raised the rumble seat but found no liquor. He
raised the seat cushion and again found nothing. The officer
then struck at the "lazyback" of the seat and noticed that it
was "harder than upholstery ordinarily is in those backs."
267 U. S., at 174. He tore open the seat cushion and discovered 68 bottles of gin and whiskey concealed inside. No warrant had been obtained for the search.
Carroll and Kiro were convicted of transporting intoxicating liquor· in violation of the National Prohibition Act. On
review of those convictions, this Court ruled that the warrantless search of the roadster was reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In an extensive opinion
written by Chief Justice Taft, the Court held:
"On reason and authority the true rule is that if the
search and seizure without a warrant are made upon
probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction, the search and sei5

On September 29, 1921, Carroll and Kiro met the agents in Grand Rapids and agreed to sell them three cases of whiskey. The sale was not consummated, however, possibly because Carroll learned the agents' true
identity. In October, the agents discovered Carroll and Kiro driving the
Oldsmobile Roadster on the road to Detroit, which was known as an active
center for the introduction of illegal liquor into this country. The agents
followed the roadster as far as East Lansing, but there abandoned the
chase.

t

'

80-2209---0PINION
UNITED STATES v. ROSS

7

zure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner
which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens." !d., at 149.
The Court explained at length the basis for this rule. The
Court noted that historically warrantless searches of vessels,
wagons, and carriages-as opposed to fixed premises such as
a home or other building-had been considered reasonable by
Congress. After reviewing legislation enacted by Congress
between 1789 and 1799, 6 the Court stated:
"Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment we find in the first Congress, and in
the following Second and Fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a
dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course
of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel
where they readily could be put out of reach of a search
warrant." I d., at 151.
The Court reviewed additional legislation passed by Congress 7 and again noted that
"the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been conThe legislation authorized customs officials to search any ship or vessel
without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that it concealed
goods subject to duty. The same legislation required a warrant for
searches of dwelling places. 267 U. S. , at 150-151.
7
In particular, the Court noted an 1815 statute that permitted customs
officers not only to board and search vessels without a warrant "but also to
stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person on which or whom
they should suspect there was merchandise which was subject to duty or
had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to
law." Id., at 151.
6
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strued, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be
obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought." ld., at 153.
Thus, since its earliest days Congress had recognized the
impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the
transportation of contraband goods. 8 It is this impracticability, viewed in historical perspective, that provided the
basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an automobile in transit, the Court recognized that an immediate intrusion is .necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit
substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable. 9
8

In light of this established history, individuals always had been on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise
to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those facts.
9
Subsequent cases make clear that the decision in Carroll was not based
on the fact that the only course available to the police was an immediate
search. As Justice Harlan later recognized, although a failure to seize a
moving automobile believed to contain contraband might deprive officers of
the illicit goods, once a vehicle itself has been stopped the exigency does
not necessarily justify a warrantless search. Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U. S. 42, 62-64 (opinion of Harlan, J.). The Court in Chambers, however-with only Justice Harlan dissenting-refused to adopt a rule that
would permit a warrantless seizure but prohibit a warrantless search.
The Court held that if police officers have probable cause to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway, they may conduct an
immediate search of the contents of that vehicle. "For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a
car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the
other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given

l
f
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In defining the nature of this "exception" to the general
rule that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used," id., at 156, the Court in
Carroll emphasized the importance of the requirement that
officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.
"Having thus established that contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other
vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come
now to consider under what circumstances such search
may be made. It would be intolerable and unreasonable
if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travellers may
be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because. of national self protection reasonably requiring one
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S., at 52.
The Court also has held that if an immediate search on the street is permissible without a warrant, a search soon thereafter at the police station is
permissible if the vehicle is impounded. Chambers, supra; Texas v.
White, 423 U. S. 67. These decisions are based on the practicalities of the
situations presented and a realistic appraisal of the relatively minor protection that a contrary rule would provide for privacy interests. Given the
scope of the initial intrusion caused by a seizure of an automobile-which
often could leave the occupants stranded on the highway-the Court rejected an inflexible rule that would force police officers in every case either
to post guard at the vehicle while a warrant is obtained or to tow the vehicle itself to the station. Similarly, if an immediate search on the scene
could be conducted, but not one at the station if the vehicle is impounded,
police often simply would search the vehicle on the street-at no advantage
to the occupants, yet possibly at certain cost to the police. The rules as
applied in particular cases may appear unsatisfactory. They reflect, however, a reasoned application of the more general rule that if an individual
gives the police probable cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contraband, he loses the right to proceed on his way without official interference.
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entering the country to identify himself as entitled to
come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country,
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free
passage without interruption or search unless there is
known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying
contraband or illegal merchandise." Id., at 153-154.
Moreover, the probable cause determination must be based
on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant
by a magistrate and not merely on the subjective good faith
of the police officers. "'[A]s we have seen, good faith is not
enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be
grounded on facts within knowledge of the [officer], which in
the judgment of the court would make his faith reasonable.'"
Id., at 161-162 (quoting Director General v. Kastenbaum,
263 u. s. 25, 28). 10
In short, the exception to the warrant requirement established in CarroU.-the scope of which we consider in this
case-applies only to searches of vehicles that are supported
by probable cause. 11 In this class of cases, a search is not un10
After reviewing the relevant authorities at some length, the Court concluded that the probable cause requirement was satisfied in the case before
it. The Court held that "the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which
they stopped and searched." !d., at 162. Cf. Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 17&-177; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102.
"See Husky v. United States, 282 U. S. 694; Scher v. United States, 305
U. S. 251; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160; Henry v. United
States, 361 U. S. 98; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U. S. 216; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42; Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67; Colorado v.
Bannister, 449 U. S. 1.
Warrantless searches of automobiles have been upheld in a variety of
factual contexts quite different from that presented in Carroll. Cf.

)

t
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reasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of
a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been
obtained. 12

III
The rationale justifying a warrantless search of an automobile that is believed to be transporting contraband arguably
applies with equal force to any movable container that is believed to be carrying an illicit substance. That argument,
however, was squarely rejected in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1.
Chadwick involved the warrantless search of a 200-pound
footlocker. Federal railroad officials in San Diego became
suspicious when they noticed that a brown footlocker loaded
onto a train bound for Boston was unusually heavy and leaking talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor
of marijuana. Narcotics agents met the train in Boston and
a trained police dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance inside the footlocker. While the agents awaited further developments, respondent Chadwick arrived and the
footlocker was placed in the trunk of Chadwick's automobile.
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433;
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364. Many of these searches do not
require a showing of probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband.
We are not called upon-and do not-consider in this case the scope of the
warrantless search that is permitted in those cases.
2
' As the Court in Carroll concluded:
"We here find the line of distinction between legal and illegal seizures of
liquor in transport in vehicles. It is certainly a reasonable distinction. It
gives the owner of an automobile or other vehicle seized under Section 26,
in absence of probable cause, a right to have restored to him the automobile, it protects him under the Weeks and Amos cases from use of the liquor
as evidence against him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to
damages. On the other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the Government and its officials ~e given the opportunity which they should have,
to make the investigation necessary to trace reasonably suspected contraband goods and to seize them." 267 U. S., at 156.
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At that point, while the trunk of the car was still open and
before the engine had been started, the agents seized the
footlocker. They later searched the footlocker without a
warrant and discovered a large quantity of marijuana.
In a subsequent criminal proceeding, Chadwick claimed
that the warrantless search of the footlocker violated the
Fourth Amendment. In the District Court, the Government
argued that as soon as the footlocker was placed in the automobile a warrantless search was permissible under Carroll.
The District Court rejected that argument, 13 and the Government did not pursue it on appeal. 14 Rather, the Government
contended in this Court that the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment applied only to searches of homes and
other "core" areas of privacy. The Court unanimously rejected that contention. 15 Writing for the Court, THE CHIEF
JUSTICE stated:
"[I]f there is little evidence that the Framers intended
the Warrant Clause to operate outside the home, there is
no evidence at all that they intended to exclude from protection of the Clause all searches occurring outside the
home. The absence of a contemporary outcry against
The District Court noted:
"In this case, there was no nexus between the search and the automobile,
merely a coincidence. The challenged search in this case was one of a footlocker, not an automobile. The search took place not in an automobile, but
in [the federal building]. The only connection that the automobile had to
this search was that, prior to its seizure, the footlocker was placed on the
floor of an automobile's open trunk." United States v. Chadwick, 393
F. Supp. 763, 772 (Mass. 1975).
"This Court specifically noted: "The Government does not contend that
the footlocker's brief contact with Chadwick's car makes this an automobile
search, but it is argued that the rationale of our automobile search cases
demonstrates the reasonableness of permitting warrantless searches of
luggage; the Government views such luggage as analagous to motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes." 433 U. S., at 11-12.
6
' See id., at 17 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).
13
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warrantless searches in public places was because, aside
from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless
searches were not a large issue in colonial America.
Thus, silence in the historical record tells us little about
the Framers' attitude toward application of the Warrant
Clause to the search of respondents' footlocker. What
we do know is that the Framers were men who focused
on the wrongs of that day but who intended the Fourth
Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which
would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it
birth." 433 U. S., at S-9 (footnote omitted).
The Court in Chadwick specifically rejected the argument
that the warrantless search was "reasonable" because a footlocker has some of the mobile characteristics that support
warrantless searches of automobiles. The Court recognized
that "a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage
are substantially greater than in an automobile," id., at 13,
and noted that the practical problems associated with the
temporary detention of a piece of luggage during the period
of time necessary to obtain a warrant are significantly less
than those associated with the detention of an automobile.
!d., at 13, n. 7. In ruling that the warrantless search of the
footlocker was unjustified, the Court reaffirmed the general
principle that closed packages and containers may not be
searched without a warrant. Cf. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S.
727; United States v. Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249. In sum, the
Court in Chadwick declined to extend the rationale of the
"automobile exception" to permit a warrantless search of any
movable container found in a public place. 16
16
The Court concluded that there is a significant difference between the
seizure of a sealed package and a subsequent search of its contents; the
search of the container in that case was "a far greater intrusion into Fourth
Amendment values than the impoundment of the footlocker." I d., at 13,
n. 8. A temporary seizure of a package or piece of luggage often may be
accomplished without as significant an intrusion upon the individual-and
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The facts in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753, were similar to those in Chadwick. In Sanders, a Little Rock police
officer received information from a reliable informant that
Sanders would arrive at the local airport on a specified flight
that afternoon carrying a green suitcase containing marijuana. The officer went to the airport. Sanders arrived on
schedule and retrieved a green suitcase from the airline baggage service. Sanders gave the suitcase to a waiting companion who placed it in the trunk of a taxi. Sanders and his
companion drove off in the cab; police officers followed and
stopped the t~xi several blocks from the airport. The officers opened the trunk, seized the suitcase, and searched it on
the scene without a warrant. As predicted, the suitcase contained marijuana.
The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless
search of the suitcase was impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment, and this Court affirmed. As in Chadwick, the
mere fact that the suitcase had been placed in the trunk of
the vehicle did not render the automobile exception of Carroll applicable; the police had probable cause to seize the suitcase before it was placed in the trunk of the cab and did not
have probable cause to search the taxi itself. 17 Since the
suitcase had been placed in the trunk, no danger existed that
its contents could have been secreted elsewhere in the vehicle. 18 As THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted in his opinion concurring
in the judgment:
without as great a burden on the police-as in the case of the seizure of an
automobile. See n. 9, supra.
17
The Arkansas Supreme Court carefully reviewed the facts of the case
and concluded: "The information supplied to the police by the confidential
informant is adequate to support the State's claim that the police had probable cause to believe that appellant's green suitcase contained a controlled
substance when the police confiscated the suitcase and opened it." 262
Ark. 595, 599, 559 S. W. 2d 704, 706 (1977). The court also noted: "The
evidence in this case supports the conclusion that the relationship between
the suitcase and the taxicab is coincidental." ld., at 600, n. 2, 559 S.W.
2d, at 706.
18
Moreover, none of the practical difficulties associated with the detention of a vehicle on a public highway that made the immediate search in

,I
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"Because the police officers had probable cause to believe that respondent's green suitcase contained marijuana before it was placed in the trunk of the taxicab,
their duty to obtain a search warrant before opening it is
clear under United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1
(1977).
Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage being transported by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the
automobile in which it was being carried, that was the
suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship between the automobile and the contraband was purely coincidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase
was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time of
respondent's arrest does not turn this into an 'automobile' exception case. The Court need say no more."
ld., at 766-767.
The Court in Sanders did not, however, rest its decision
solely on the authority of Chadwick. In rejecting the State's
argument that the warrantless search of the suitcase was justified on the ground that it had been taken from an automobile lawfully stopped on the street, the Court broadly suggested that a warrantless search of a container found in an
automobile could never be sustained as part of a warrantless
search of the automobile itself. 19 The Court did not suggest
Carroll reasonable could justify an immediate search of the suitcase, since
the officers had no interest in detaining the taxi or its driver.
9
' The Court stated that "the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other parcels depends not at all upon whether they
are seized from an automobile." 442 U. S., at 764, n. 13. This general
rule was limited only by the observation that "[n]ot all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a
kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred
from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a
package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby obviating the need for a war-
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that it mattered whether probable cause existed to search
the entire vehicle. It is clear, however, that in neither
Chadwick nor Sanders did the police have probable cause to
search the vehicle or anything within it except the footlocker
in the former case and the green suitcase in the latter.
Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, however, was a case
in which suspicion was not directed at a specific container.
In that case the Court for the first time was forced to consider whether police officers who are entitled to conduct a
warrantless search of an automobile stopped on a public roadway may open a container found within the vehicle. In the
early morning of January 5, 1975, police officers stopped
Robbins' station wagon because he was driving erratically.
Robbins got out of the car, but later returned to obtain the
vehicle's registration papers. When he opened the car door,
the officers smelled marijuana smoke. One of the officers
searched Robbins and discovered a vial of liquid; in a search
of the interior of the car the officer found marijuana. The
police officers then opened the tailgate of the station wagon
and raised the cover of a recessed luggage compartment. In
the compartment they found two packages wrapped in green
opaque plastic. The police unwrapped the packages and discovered a large amount of marijuana in each.
Robbins was charged with various drug offenses and
moved to suppress the contents of the plastic packages.
The California Court of Appeal held that "[s]earch of the
automobile was proper when the officers learned that appellant was smoking marijuana when they stopped him" 20 and
that the warrantless search of the packages was justified because "the contents of the packages could have been inferred
from their outward appearance, so that appellant could not
have held a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
the contents." 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780,
783 (1980).
rant." Ibid.
20
103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 39, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782 (1980).

l
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This Court reversed. Writing for a plurality, Justice
Stewart rejected the argument that the outward appearance
of the packages precluded Robbins from having a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their contents. He also squarely
rejected the argument that there is a constitutional distinction between searches of luggage and searches of "less worthy'' containers. Justice Stewart reasoned that all containers are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment unless
their contents are in plain view. The plurality concluded
that the warrantless search was impermissible because
Chadwick and Sanders had established that "a closed piece of
luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally
protected to the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage
found anywhere else." 453 U. S., at 425.
In a concurring opinion, JUSTICE POWELL, the author of
the Court's opinion in Sanders, stated that "[t]he plurality's
approach strains the rationales of our prior cases and imposes
substantial· burdens on law enforcement without vindicating
any significant values of privacy." Id., at 429. 21 He noted
21

"While the plurality's blanket warrant requirement does not even purport to protect any privacy interest, it would impose substantial new burdens on law enforcement. Confronted with a cigar box or a Dixie cup in
the course of a probable cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the
conscientious policeman would be required to take the object to a magistrate, fill out the appropriate forms, await the decision, and finally obtain a
warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while the warrant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer from his
normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn from
the public's limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes, is justified when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests. In my
view, the plurality's requirement cannot be so justified. The aggregate
burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable cause to
search the most trivial container may be heavy and will not be compensated by the advancement of important Fourth Amendment values." 453
U. S., at 433-434 (POWELL, J., concurring).
The substantial burdens on law enforcement identified by JUSTICE PowELL would, of course, not be affected by the character of the container
found during an automobile search. No comparable practical problems
arise when the official suspicion is confined to a particular piece of luggage,
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that possibly "the controlling question should be the scope of
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement," id., at
435, and explained that under that view
"when the police have probable cause to search an automobile, rather than only to search a particular container
that fortuitously is located in it, the exigencies that allow
the police to search the entire automobile without a warrant support the warrantless search of every container
found therein. See post, at 451 and n. 13 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent with the
holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an
'automobile case,' because the police there had probable
cause to search the double-locked footlocker and the suitcase respectively before either came near an automobile." Ibid.
The parti~s in Robbins had not pressed that argument, however, and JusTICE POWELL concluded that institutional constraints made it inappropriate to re-examine basic doctrine
without full adversary presentation. He concurred in the
judgment, since it was supported-although not compelledby the Court's opinion in Sanders, and stated that a future
case might present a better opportunity for thorough consideration of the basic principles in this troubled area.
That case has arrived. Unlike Chadwick and Sanders, in
this case police officers had probable cause to search respondent's entire vehicle. 22 Unlike Robbins, in this case the paras in Chadwick and Sanders. Cf. n. 19, supra.
22
The en bane Court of Appeals stated that "[b]ased on the tip the police
received, Ross's car was properly stopped and searched, and the pouch and
bag were properly seized." 655 F. 2d, at 1168 (footnote omitted). The
court explained:
"[W]e believe it clear that the police had ample and reasonable cause to
stop Ross and to search his car. The informer had supplied accurate information on prior occasions, and he was an eyewitness to sales of narcotics
by Ross. He said he had just seen Ross take narcotics from the trunk of

J
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ties have squarely addressed the question whether, in the
course of a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile,
police are entitled to open containers found within the vehicle. We now address that question. Its answer is determined by the scope of the search that is authorized by the exception to the warrant requirement set forth in Carroll.
IV
In Carroll itself, the whiskey that the prohibition agents
seized was not in plain view. It was discovered only after an
officer opened the rumble seat and tore open the upholstery
of the lazyback. The Court did not find the scope of the
search unreasonable. Having stopped Carroll and Kiro on a
public road and subjected them to the indignity of a vehicle
search-which the Court found to be a reasonable intrusion
on their privacy because it was based on probable cause that
their vehicle was transporting contraband-prohibition
agents were entitled to tear open a portion of the roadster
itself. The scope of the search was no greater than a magistrate could have authorized by issuing a warrant based on the
probable cause that justified the search. Since such a warrant could have authorized the agents to open the rear portion of the roadster and to rip the upholstery in their search
for concealed whiskey, the search was constitutionally
permissible.
In Chambers v. Maroney the police found weapons and
stolen property "concealed in a compartment under the dashboard." 399 U. S., at 44. No suggestion was made that the
scope of the search was impermissible. It would be illogical
to assume that the outcome of Chambers-or the outcome of
his car in making a sale and heard him say he possessed additional narcotics." !d., at 1168, n. 22.
The court further noted that "[i]n this case, the informant told the police
that Ross had narcotics in the trunk of his car. No specific container was
identified." !d., at 1166.
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Carroll itself-would have been different if the police had
found the secreted contraband enclosed within a secondary
container and had opened that container without a warrant.
If it was reasonable for prohibition agents to rip open the upholstery in Carroll, it certainly would have been reasonable
for them to look into a burlap sack stashed inside; if it was
reasonable to open the concealed compartment in Chambers,
it would have been equally reasonable to open a paper bag
crumpled within it. A contrary rule could produce absurd
results inconsistent with the decision in Carroll itself.
In its application of Carroll, this Court in fact has sustained warrantless searches of containers found during a lawful search of an automobile. In Husty v. United States, 282
U. S. 694, the Court upheld a warrantless seizure of whiskey
found during a search of an automobile, some of which was
discovered in "whiskey bags" that could have contained other
goods. 23 In Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251, federal officers seized and searched packages of unstamped liquor
found in the trunk of an automobile searched without a warrant. As described by a police officer who participated in
the search: "I turned the handle and opened the trunk and
found the trunk completely filled with packages wrapped in
brown paper, and tied with twine; I think somewhere around
thirty packages, each one containing six bottles." 24 In these
cases it was not contended that police officers needed a warrant to open the whiskey bags or to unwrap the brown paper
za At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked the police officer
who had conducted the search: "Isn't it possible to put other goods in a bag
that has the resemblance of a whiskey bag?" The officer responded: "I
suppose it is. I did not think of that at that time. I knew it was whiskey,
I was sure it was." App., O.T. 1930, No. 477, p. 27.
24
App. , O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 33. The brief of then Solicitor General
Robert Jackson noted that the items searched "were wrapped in very
heavy brown wrapping paper with at least two wrappings and with a heavy
cord around them cross-wise so that they could readily be lifted." Brief
for United States, O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 6.
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packages. These decisions nevertheless "have much weight,
as they show that this point neither occurred to the bar or the
bench." Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61,
88 (Marshall, C. J.). The fact that no such argument was
even made illuminates the profession's understanding of the
scope of the search permitted under Carroll. Indeed, prior
to the decisions in Chad'Wick and Sanders, courts routinely
had held that containers and packages found during a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile also could be
searched without a warrant. 25
As we have stated, the decision in Carroll was based on
the Court's appraisal of practical considerations viewed in the
perspective of history. It is therefore significant that the
practical consequences of the Carroll decision would be
largely nullified if the permissible scope of a warrantless
search of an automobile did not include containers and packages found inside the vehicle. Contraband goods rarely are
strewn across the trunk or floor of a car; since by their very
nature such goods must be withheld from public view, they
rarely can be placed in an automobile unless they are enclosed within some form of container. 26 The Court in Carroll
25
See, e. g., United States v. Soriano, 497 F. 2d 147, 14~150 (CA5 1974)
(en bane); United States v. Vento, 533 F . 2d 838, 867, n. 101 (CA3 1976);
United States v. Tramunti , 513 F . 2d 1087, 1104 (CA2 1975); United States
v. Issod, 508 F . 2d 990, 993 (CA7 1974); United States v. Evans, 481 F. 2d
990, 994 (CA9 1973); United States v. Bowman, 487 F. 2d 1229 (CAlO
1973). Many courts continued to apply this rule following the decision in
Chadwick. Cf. United States v. Milhollan, 599 F. 2d 518, 526--527 (CA3
1979); United States v. Gaultney, 581 F. 2d 1137, 1144-1145 (CA5 1978);
United States v. Finnegan, 568 F. 2d 637, 640-641 (CA9 1977). In ruling
that police could search luggage and other containers found during a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile, courts often assumed that the
"automobile exception" of Carroll applied whenever a container in an automobile was believed to contain contraband. That view, of course, has
since been qualified by Chadwick and Sanders.
2S It is noteworthy that the early legislation on which the Court relied in
Carroll concerned the enforcement of laws imposing duties on imported
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held that "contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for
without a warrant." 267 U. S., at 153 (emphasis added).
As we noted in Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 104, the
decision in Carroll "merely relaxed the requirements for a
warrant on grounds of impracticability." It neither broadened nor limited the scope of a lawful search based on probable cause.
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the
entire area in which the object of the search may be found
and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. 27
Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home
for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets,
chests, drawers, and. containers in which the weapon might
be found. A warrant to open a footlocker to search for marijuana would also authorize the opening of packages found inmerchandise. See nn. 6 and 7, supra. Presumably such merchandise was
shipped then in containers of various kinds, just as it is today. Since Congress had authorized warrantless searches of vessels and beasts for imported merchandise, it is inconceivable that it intended a customs officer to
obtain a warrant for every package discovered during the search; certainly
Congress intended customs officers to open shipping containers when necessary and not merely to examine the exterior of cartons or boxes in which
smuggled goods might be concealed. During virtually the entire history of
our country-whether contraband was transported in a horse drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern automobile-it has been assumed that a
lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of any container that
might conceal the object of the search.
27
In describing the permissible scope of a search of a home pursuant to a
warrant, Professor LaFave notes:
"Places within the described premises are not excluded merely because
some additional act of entry or opening may be required. 'In countless
cases in which warrants described only the land and the buildings, a search
of desks, cabinets, closets and similar items has been permitted.' " 2
LaFave, Search and Seizure 152 (1978) (quoting Massey v. Commonwealth, 305 S.W. 2d 755, 756 (Ky. 1957)).
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side. A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search
of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object of
the search. When a legitimate search is under way, and
when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined,
nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in
the case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a
vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand. 28
This rule applies equally to all containers, as indeed we believe it must. One point on which the Court was in virtually
unanimous agreement in Robbins was that a constitutional
distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers
would be improper. 29 Even though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags,
locked trunks, lunch -buckets, and orange crates were placed
on one side of the line or the other, 30 the central purpose of
28

The practical considerations that justify a warrantless search of an
automobile continue to apply until the entire search of the automobile and
its contents has been completed. Arguably, the entire vehicle itself (including its upholstery) could be searched without a warrant, with all
wrapped articles and containers found during that search then taken to a
magistrate. But prohibiting police from opening immediately a container
in which the object of the search is most likely to be found and instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle would actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy interests. Moreover, until the container itself was
opened the police could never be certain that the contraband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle; thus in every case in
which a container was found, the vehicle would need to be secured while a
warrant was obtained. Such a requirement would be directly inconsistent
with the rationale supporting the decisions in Carroll and Chambers. Cf.
nn. 19 and 22, supra.
29
Cf. 453 U. S., at 426-427 (plurality opinion); id., at 436 (BLACKMUN, J.,
dissenting); i d., at 443 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); i d. , at 447 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting).
30
If the distinction is based on the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects only those containers that objectively manifest an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the propriety of a war-
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the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction. For
just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic
mansion, 31 so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush
and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf
claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked
attache case.
As Justice Stewart stated in Robbins, the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container
that conceals its contents from plain view. 453 U. S., at 427
(plurality opinion). But the protection afforded by the
Amendment varies in different settings. The luggage carried by a traveler entering the country may be searched at
random by a customs officer; the luggage may be searched no
matter how great the traveler's desire to conceal the contents
may be. A container carried at the time of arrest often may
be searched without a warrant and even without any specific
suspicion concerning its contents. A container that may conceal the object of a search authorized by a warrant may be
opened immediately; the individual's interest in privacy must
give way to the magistrate's official determination of probable cause.
In the saine manner, an individual's expectation of privacy
rantless search necessarily would turn on much more than the fabric of the
container. A paper bag stapled shut and marked "private" might be found
to manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy, as could a cardboard box
stacked on top of two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the warrantless search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of all the
surrounding circumstances.
3
' " 'The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of
the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow
through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter-all his forces dares not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement!'" Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 307 (quoting
remarks attributed to William Pitt); cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S.
573, 601 n. 54.
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in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause
is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband. Certainly the privacy interests in a car's trunk or
glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable
container. An individual undoubtedly has a significant interest that the upholstery of his automobile will not be ripped or
a hidden compartment within it opened. These interests
must yield to the authority of a search, however, which-in
light of CarroU-does not itself require the prior approval of
a magistrate. The scope of a warrantless search based on
probable cause is no narrower-and no broader-than the
scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause. Only the prior approval of the magistrate is
waived; the search otherwise is as the magistrate could
authorize. 32
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is
not defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to
believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will
not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a
suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed
in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does
not justify a search of the entire cab.

v
Our decision today is inconsistent with the disposition in
In choosing to search without a warrant on their own assessment of
probable cause, police officers of course lose the protection that a warrant
would provide to them in an action for damages brought by an individual
claiming that the search was unconstitutional. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365
U. S. 167. Although an officer may establish that he acted in good faith in
conducting the search by other evidence, a warrant issued by a magistrate
normally suffices to establish it.
112
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Robbins v. California and with the portion of the opinion in
Arkansas v. Sanders on which the plurality in Robbins relied. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis does not
preclude this action. Although we have rejected some of the
reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to our holding in that case;
although we reject the precise holding in Robbins, there was
no Court opinion supporting a single rationale for its judgment and the reasoning we adopt today was not presented by
the parties in that case. Moreover, it is clear that no legitimate reliance interest can be frustrated by our decision today. 33 Of greatest importance, we are convinced that the
rule we apply in this case is faithful to the interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment that the Court has followed with
substantial consistency throughout our history.
We reaffirm the basic rule of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence stated by Justice Stewart for a unanimous Court in
Mincey v: Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390:
"The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable
searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (footnotes omitted)."
The exception recognized in Carroll is unquestionably one
that is "specifically established and well-delineated." We
hold that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by
that exception is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable
Any interest in maintaining the status quo that might be asserted by
persons who may have structured their business of distributing narcotics
or other illicit substances on the basis of judicial precedents clearly would
not be legitimate.
33
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cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search.
. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.

~u:.p-unu

<qcnri of tqt ~ b" ~taftg

~agltinghtn. ~.

QJ.

20,?'t~

CHAMB E RS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 26, 1982

Re: No. 80-2209 - U.S. v. Ross
De ar John:
This will confirm my "private" join subject
to the minor suggestions I made.

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: - - - -- --:---- --

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-2209
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
ALBERT ROSS, JR.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June-, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
In my opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 429
(1981), concurring in the judgment, I stated that the judgment was justified, though not compelled, by the Court's
opinion in Arkansas v. Sander, 442 U. S. 753 (1979). I did
not agree, however, with the "bright line" rule a1 '"iculated by
the plurality opinion. Rather, I repeated the view I long
have held that one's "reasonable expectation of privacy" is a
particularly relevant factor in determining the validity of a
warrantless search. I have recognized, that with respect to
automobiles in general, this expectation can be only a limited
one. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at 761; AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (PowELL, J., concurring). I continue to think that in many situations one's reasonable expectation of privacy may be a
decisive factor in a search case.
It became evident last Term, however, from the five opinions written in Robbins-in none of which THE CHIEF JusTICE joined-that it is essential to have a Court opinion in
automobile search cases that provides "specific guidance to
police and courts in this reoccuring situation". Robbins v.
California, 453 U. S. at, 435 (PowELL, J., concurring). The
Court's opinion today, written by JUSTICE STEVENS and now
joined by four other Justices, will afford this needed guid-
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ance. It is fair also to say that, given Carroll v. United
States , 267 U. S. 132 (1925) and Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U. S. 42 (1970), the Court's decision does not depart substantially from Fourth Amendment doctrine in automobile cases.
Moreover, in enunciating a readily understood and applied
rule, today's decision is consistent with the similar step taken
last Term in Belton v. New York, 453 U. S. 454 (1981).
I join the Court's opinion.
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